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ABSTRACT 
This case study is offered with the purpose of informing the initiation of regional 
collaborative efforts nationwide. This research effort examines a network of networks, 
called here a Preparedness Web, utilized to meet locally identified regional homeland 
security preparedness needs. How and why these networks were established is 
documented to allow other regions to draw parallels to their own situations.  A 
measurement of the systems collaborative capacity is identified to validate the systems 
functionality. Recommendations are offered for other regions considering collaborative 
efforts based upon a retrospective examination of the system originators’ strategic intent. 
To the extent to which this effort can be used to illustrate successful collaboration, on a 
national basis, it presents a replicable “ground up” process designed to entice more 
agencies to undertake or enhance their own regional collaborative preparedness efforts. 
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DEDICATION 
The motivation behind this effort emanates from a recognized need to better 
support our nation’s all-hazard response and recovery personnel. With over twenty years 
of field experience and as a member of a federal Interagency Incident Management 
Team, I have served regions, agencies, and responders across our nation. It was the 
frustrations experienced in the aftermath of Katrina that, for the first time, made me 
contemplate giving up incident management. To do so would have been to give up on the 
responders by way of giving up on the demonstrated collaborative needs that are 
pervasive throughout our country.  It is to those ill-served by non-collaborative systems 
that I humbly offer this body of research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Homeland security’s all-hazard preparedness needs exceed the capacity of any 
one agency, discipline, or level of governance, as demonstrated by events such as the 
Murrah Federal Building bombing, the 9/11 attacks, the 2001 anthrax attacks, and, most 
recently, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The inherent complexity in a regional homeland 
security preparedness effort is evidenced by the number of disparate agencies with 
statutorily-mandated roles interacting with non-mandated preparedness partners (e.g., 
volunteer groups, university researchers, private critical infrastructures, and a variety of 
utility districts) in dynamic and non-linear relationships. Despite the acknowledged 
complexity, some regions across the nation are still not using interagency collaboration to 
meet their homeland security preparedness needs.1 Any approach to preparedness that 
does not embrace interagency collaboration will be episodic at best while ignoring some 
of the most painful homeland security lessons learned in our nation’s history.2 
Some concerns cited for not utilizing interagency collaboration include: (a) 
ineffective leadership; (b) lack of commitment, primarily stemming from a lack of trust 
and knowledge of interdisciplinary capabilities; (c) poor communications; and (d) poor 
planning leading to resource allocation issues.3 These barriers are cited by field 
commanders who, at the same time, acknowledge the potential benefit of collaboration to 
more effectively meet their homeland security mission. An example of the chaos 
resulting from this aversion to collaborative approaches to preparedness was televised 
nationwide in the fall of 2005, as the Gulf Coast floundered in the wake of Hurricane  
 
                                                 
1 Amy K. Donahue and Robert V Tuohy, “Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 
(July 2006): 6-8. 
2 William V. Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for Terrorist 
Threats,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 1 (2005): 8 
3Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 6-8. 
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Katrina. This lack of collaborative preparedness hindered the local, state and federal 
response well past the seventy-two hour threshold that is traditionally touted for citizen 
preparedness needs.4  
Unintentionally exacerbating this problem is the multitude of small to mid-size 
agencies choosing to ignore collaboration as a tool for homeland security preparedness 
because they do not see credible homeland security risks for their regions.5 This is 
commonly referred to as “It won’t happen here.”  This position is rather ironic as it is the 
small to mid-size agencies that send a proportionally large share of their resources to 
assist the larger urban areas in a given time of need (e.g., the 2003 firestorms in Southern 
California).  
The complexity of interagency collaborative preparedness can be solved. The 
challenge is how to design and support governmental systems that can adapt to the urgent 
demands and complex operating conditions in extreme events.6 However, even at the 
most basic level this solution is not possible unless one appreciates all of the actors and 
the roles they play within any given region. In a practical sense, without having 
participated in planning, exercises, and operations in interagency collaborative network 
systems, assisting hierarchical organizations can be as much of a hindrance as a help. 
These hindrances arise from factors (e.g., a lack of knowledge of interagency capabilities 
and procedures) that can potentially affect the behavior of the whole system.7 Regionally, 





                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Preparing Makes Sense, Get Ready Now, 
http://www.ready.gov/America/_downloads/Ready_Brochre_Screend_EN_20040129.pdf [Accessed July 
26, 2006].  
5 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We don’t Learn,” 10-11. 
6 Louise Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Response to Terrorism and Other Extreme Events,” 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 32, no. 4 (2002): 29-49. 
7 Phillip Anderson, “Complexity Theory and Organizational Science,” Organizational Science 10, no. 3 (May-
June 1999): 217. 
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insure reciprocal needs can be met. Trying to build these needed relationships in the face 
of a disaster is difficult or impossible, given the charged and high-pressure atmosphere.8 
B. PURPOSE  
This case study has been conducted with the purpose of informing the initiation of 
regional collaborative efforts nationwide.  The research examines a regional preparedness 
system that extensively utilizes regional collaborative networks to meet its homeland 
security preparedness needs. This framework is referred to as a “preparedness web” for 
the purposes of this research effort. To the extent to which this effort can be used to 
illustrate successful collaboration and meet the expressed concerns of field leadership, on 
a national basis, it presents a replicable “ground up” process to entice agencies averse to 
collaboration to undertake or enhance their own regional collaborative preparedness 
efforts. 
C. BACKGROUND  
This thesis examines three regional collaborative networks functioning in the 
greater Sacramento Metropolitan region of California: (1) the Operational Area Counsel, 
(2) the Tactical Commanders Network, and (3) the Consortium of Technical Responders. 
The study includes an examination of how the networks were developed as well as an 
assessment of their current collaborative capacities.9 These networks are illustrative of a 
greater number of networks currently functioning within the case study region and were 
chosen for this research effort due to their nationwide preparedness applicability and their 
spread across the tactical-strategic continuum. For context, a non-comprehensive list of 
the functioning networks in the case study region is provided in Table 1. Each of these  
 
 
                                                 
8 Brian Jackson, Information Sharing and Emergency Responder Safety Management (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2006), 2. 
9 Susan Hocevar, Gail Thomas, and Erik Jansen, A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in 
an Interagency Context, Project prepared for the Office of Domestic Preparedness (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006), 19-28. 
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regional networks has a specific mission filling an identified regional need. The use of 
these networks across the region culminates in what the author refers to as a preparedness 
web. 
 
Table 1. Sample Regional Collaborative Networks in Sacramento, CA (non-
comprehensive). 
Regional Collaborative Network Make-Up Strategic / Tactical Focus 
Sacramento Operational Area Counsel * All Countywide Governance Strategic Preparedness 
Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Ctr. Multi-disp. / Multi-governance Strategic Preparedness / Tactical Response 
Sac Regional Radio Communication Systems Multi-disciplinary Strategic Preparedness  
Sacramento Multi-Aircraft Response Team Multi-disciplinary Tactical  Response 
Tactical Commanders Network * Multi-disp. / Multi-governance Strategic Preparedness / Tactical Response 
Consortium of Technical Responders * Multi-disp. / Multi-governance Strategic Preparedness / Tactical Response 
Medical / Operational Oversight Committee  Multi-disciplinary Strategic Preparedness / Tactical Response 
* Network to be examined in this research effort. 
 
 
By far, the oldest of the three networks examined in this case study, the 
Operational Area Counsel (OAC), has been in use in California for more than sixty years. 
Originally established to facilitate emergency response under the California Master 
Mutual Aid System, each OAC maintains a focus on all-hazard strategic preparedness for 
the county within which it operates. These strategic issues include, but are not limited to, 
planning to mitigate regional vulnerabilities and subsequent grant coordination and 
allocation. In Sacramento County twelve people sit on the OAC; the agency and 
discipline representatives are listed in Table 2. The function of the operational area 
effects all local governments contained therein, thus each local government has a stake in 
the development and maintenance of the OAC functions. 
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Table 2. Operational Area Counsel – Representative Make-up. 
Sacramento County Representative 
City of Sacramento Representative 
City of Folsom Representative 
City of Galt Representative 
City of Isleton Representative 
Fire Districts Representative 
Law Enforcement Agencies Representative 
Flood Control & Reclamation Districts Representative 
Utility Districts Representative 
Park Districts Representative 
Cemetery Districts Representative 
Water Districts Representative 
School Districts Representative 
 
The second network to be examined is the Tactical Commanders Network (TCN), 
the core of which is made up of regional law enforcement Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) and Explosive Ordinance Detail (EOD) field commanders along with fire 
department HAZMAT field commanders. Twenty-two members sit on the Tactical 
Commanders Network; the member agencies are listed in Table 3. The Tactical 
Commanders Network was established in 2003, and meets on a monthly basis to discuss 
and exercise complex issues of inter- and intra-disciplinary preparedness in an effort to 
make incident response more efficient. Somewhat contra-indicated by its name, the 
efforts of this network actually bridge the tactical-strategic continuum. For example, its 
efforts include (but are not limited to) strategic regional planning as well as standardizing 
tactical methodologies and equipment. For context, a sample agenda for the Tactical 
Commanders Network is provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 3. Agencies Represented in the Tactical Commanders Network. 
Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center * 
Sacramento County Sheriff Department Violence Suppression & Narcotic Investigations  
Roseville Police for the Roseville and Rocklin Regional SWAT Team  
Sacramento County Sheriff Department Explosive Ordinance Detail  
City of Roseville Explosive Ordinance Detail   
University of California at Davis Police Department 
Sacramento County Sheriff Criminal Intelligence Unit  
Sacramento City Police Department, Explosive Ordinance Detail   
Sacramento Regional Transit Police  
Sacramento City Fire Department, Special Operations ** 
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District, Special Operations ** 
Roseville City Fire Department, Special Operations ** 
Sacramento County Department of Public Health  
Sacramento County Environmental Management Department ** 
Department of Homeland Security / Transportation Security Administration 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
* More than one representative 
** Encompasses Hazardous Materials 
 
Finally, the Consortium of Technical Responders (CTR) is a multi-discipline, 
multi-governance-level preparedness network that was established in 2005. Thirty-three 
members sit on the Consortium of Technical Responders; the member agencies are listed 
in Table 4. Also bridging the tactical-strategic continuum, the CTR meets once a month 
and focuses on chemical, biological, and radioactive incident preparedness issues 
encompassing inter- and intra-disciplinary approaches. Examples of their efforts include 
the standardization of disparate policies and regional capability advancement. For 
context, a sample agenda for the Consortium of Technical Responders is provided in 
Appendix B.  
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Table 4. Agencies Represented in the Consortium of Technical Responders 
City of Roseville Fire Department, Special Operations* 
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District, Special Operations * 
Sacramento City Fire Department, Special Operations * 
City of West Sacramento  Fire Department  
Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center* 
Sacramento County  Public Health * 
Placer County  Public Health  
Sacramento County Sheriff Department 
Sacramento City Police Department 
Sacramento County Emergency Medical Services Authority  
City of West Sacramento Police Department  
City of Roseville Police Department  
Sacramento County  District Attorney  
Sacramento County Crime Lab  
California State Office of Emergency Services  
University of California,  Davis * 
California Highway Patrol - Hazardous Materials Division * 
US Department of Defense - 95th CST  
United States Postal Inspection Service * 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
United States Coast Guard  
 
* More than one representative 
 
The OAC, TCN, and CTR, as representative regional collaborative networks, are 
modules in a replicable system designed to achieve desired preparedness benefits through 
alliance. Simultaneously, they are designed to reduce the sources of resistance to utilizing 
collaboration in homeland security preparedness efforts. These sources of resistance 
include: (a) ineffective leadership; (b) lack of commitment, primarily stemming from a 
lack of trust and knowledge of interdisciplinary capabilities; (c) poor communications; 
and (d) poor planning leading to resource allocation issues.10 This preparedness web 
system is designed to be initiated by local governance agencies with a regional outlook to 
insure that the area’s preparedness system mirrors the response system. 
Furthermore, this system is scalable. The complexity in every region varies, and 
so too will the structures of any regional preparedness web. In addition, the preparedness 
                                                 
10Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 6-8. 
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web system embraces both the tactical and strategic foci, providing the necessary 
robustness required of all-hazard homeland security preparedness.  
In the preparedness web, each of the regional collaborative networks brings 
disparate agencies together under a specific and clearly defined mission – with 
measurable goals and objectives – in pursuit of collective outcomes.11 A critical aspect of 
to the preparedness web’s effectiveness is that the agencies involved go far beyond what 
are thought of as traditional first responders: they encompass a multi-disciplinary/multi-
governance level cross-section that is representative of complex homeland security 
incident management. The immediate benefit is a much more holistic look at regional 
preparedness that accounts for the needs of all preparedness partners.  Each regional 
collaborative network within the preparedness web is organized as an all-channel 
network in which every node (member or agency) is connected to every other node in the 
system to enhance efficiency and resiliency. A representative picture of what a single 
regional collaborative network looks like, in this case the Sacramento Consortium of 
Technical Responders, is displayed in Figure 1.  
 
                                                 
11 Susan Hocevar, Gail Thomas, and Erik Jansen, “Building Collaborative Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for 
Homeland Security Preparedness,” in Innovation Through Collaboration (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2006), 3.   
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Figure 1. The Sacramento Consortium of Technical Responders. 
 
As each of the Regional Collaborative Networks is linked to each other, an 
extremely resilient preparedness web is extended across the region as illustrated in Figure 
2. The linkages providing connectivity of the networks within the preparedness web are 
critical and accomplished by cross-pollination within the networks themselves. This 
purposeful inter-network linkage serves the preparedness needs of each network while 
minimizing duplication of effort and significantly reducing gaps in preparedness. As 
illustrated, the networks can clearly transcend geo-political lines through the use of 
different types of agreements (e.g., mutual and automatic aid, memorandums of 
understanding, and joint powers agreements). It should be noted that Figure 2 is provided 
for conceptualization purposes; for clarity only three of many networks are displayed. 
The preparedness web system’s flexibility and scalability allows networks to be either 
wholly contained within a geo-political boundary or to transcend boundaries as dictated 













Figure 2. Illustration of the Sacramento Regional Preparedness Web (non-
comprehensive). 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research effort goes beyond just highlighting the functionality of the 
preparedness web system; it also examines why and how the system was implemented, 
allowing other regions to draw parallels to their own situations with the vision of 
maximizing applicability. The following research questions are addressed: 
 
1. Why and how were the Regional Collaborative Networks developed? 
2. What is the collaborative capacity of the preparedness web system? 
3. What opportunities for system improvement can be identified? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used to answer the research questions included both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitatively, a survey was used to measure the 
collaborative capacity of the system and identify opportunities for improvement. 
Qualitatively, personal interviews were conducted to answer why and how the Tactical 






Information on the initiation of the third network, the Operational Area Counsel, is drawn 
from archival data and presented in the Background section of this chapter.  
F. BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
Critical examination of the Sacramento region’s preparedness web provides an 
opportunity to identify potential system improvements of direct benefit to the case 
study region and indirectly benefiting any other regions that undertake a similar 
effort. In light of our country’s demonstrated lack of preparedness for complex 
interagency incidents, there is value in the systematic examination, validation, and 
presentation of any regional preparedness system that takes a multi-disciplinary and 
multi-governance level approach. By addressing the stated concerns of field 
commanders, this system is intended to be especially beneficial to regions currently 
opting out of a designated preparedness methodology. Finally, this research project will 
assist in the validation of the collaborative capacity audit developed by Susan 
Hocevar, Gail Thomas, and Erik Jansen.12  
G. OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II – Literature Review: An examination of the current relevant literature 
on the topics of network and complexity theory, collaboration measurement, and 
organizational change theories. 
Chapter III – Research Methodology: An operational explanation of the 
methodologies utilized in this research effort.  
Chapter IV – Quantitative Results: An analysis of the survey results obtained in 
this research effort. These results quantify the collaborative capacity of the regional 
collaborative networks. 
                                                 
12 Hocevar et al. A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity, 19-28.  
 12
Chapter V – Qualitative Results: An explanation and interpretation of the 
interview results obtained in this research effort, clarifying how and why the regional 
collaborative networks were established.  
Chapter VI – Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations: A summation of the 
research effort and subsequent conclusions reached. Recommendations are offered in a 
framework conducive to managing complex adaptive systems.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
To date, the available research on collaboration, as well as successful field 
examples, have been inadequate in addressing the sources of resistance or in providing 
sufficient motivation to encourage broader engagement of interagency collaboration. This 
claim is empirically supported by after-action reports such as the 9/11 Commission 
Report13 and Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned,14 by policy documents such as the 
National Preparedness Goal,15 and reports from boots-on-the-ground homeland security 
professionals.16  
This literature review looks at network theory and complexity theory, followed by 
an examination of collaboration theory – specifically the assessment of collaborative 
capacity. Lastly, work in the area of organizational change theory is discussed in an effort 
to highlight predictable problem areas faced by those organizations undertaking 
transformation. 
A brief examination of The National Preparedness Goal (NPG) offers situational 
context.  This document provides the nation with strategic direction to meet three 
overarching priorities and four capability-specific priorities, as shown in Figure 3.17   
Notably, the first overarching priority is the expansion of regional collaboration.  
 
 
                                                 
13 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States,,9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York, W.W. Norton Company, 
2004), 353.   
14 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), 52. 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: The White 
House, 2005), 13. 
16 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 1. 




Figure 3. National Preparedness Goal – Seven National Priorities. 
 
It would be simplistic to .point to the first overarching priority of expanding 
regional collaboration and recount its importance to this thesis and the country’s 
preparedness effort; to do so only sheds light on a portion of the issue’s complexity. As 
indicated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, many calls for expanded collaboration 
have been made. The fact that those calls are ongoing would indicate that perhaps the 
issue of collaboration is more complex than it appears.  
Michael Wermuth points out that homeland security’s all-hazard preparedness 
needs exceed the capacity of any one agency, discipline, or level of governance.18 Given 
this position, as one moves down the list of National Priorities into the Capability 
Specific Priorities it is clear that expanded regional collaboration needs actually 
transcend all organizations’ abilities to carry out the items listed, as shown in Figure 4. 19  
                                                 
18 Michael Wermuth, Enhancing Emergency Preparedness in California (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2006), 6. 
19 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, 13. 
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Figure 4. National Preparedness Goal - Eight Priority Capabilities. 
 
Interagency collaboration in homeland security preparedness efforts could mean 
many things to many people; the following definition is provided as a foundation upon 
which this literature review is built. “Interagency collaboration is the act of disparate 
organizations entering into, developing, and sustaining inter-organizational systems in 
pursuit of collective outcomes.”20 
B.  NETWORK AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 
The examination of network theory and complexity theory are combined here to 
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evaluating a system of networks, separating these theories presents difficulties. Phillip 
Anderson points out that the simple causal representations of network theory are 
inadequate for modeling systems with complex interconnections and feedback loops.21  
The understanding of complex systems is critical as the central focus of this research 
project examines how and why a network of networks was developed and further 
examines the dynamic interactions of those networks. 
To provide the reader with context for the complexity theory inherent in this 
discussion, a Cynefin22 sense-making framework is depicted in Figure 5. Reading the 
right side of the figure, the initiation and replication of regional collaborative networks – 
as the central vision of this study – lies in the realm of “what is known” and the 
“knowable” in homeland security and the social sciences. For example, social network 
theory can indicate best practices (the known) to build a network; and homeland security 
provides a mission for analysis and scenario planning (the knowable), ultimately 
indicating who should likely populate that particular network.  
         
                                    
Figure 5. Sense-Making Domains. 
 
                                                 
21 Anderson, “Complexity Theory,” 216 
22 C. F. Kurtz and D.J. Snowden,  “The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and 
complicated world,” IBM Systems Journal 42, no. 3 (2003): 468.  
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However, as one moves to the upper left side of the figure, the dynamic 
interaction of these regional collaborative networks, defined as complex adaptive 
systems, resides in the realm of the complex, the home of complexity theory. When 
defining complex adaptive systems, Phillip Anderson indicates these networked systems 
are complex, in that they are diverse and made up of multiple interconnected elements, 
and adaptive, in that they have the capacity to change and learn from experience.23 
Louise Comfort describes this same characteristic as auto-adaptation or a “learning 
strategy”.24 In a visual representation of a complex system shown in Figure 6, one can 
see how complex systems involve (a) many components, (b) dynamically interacting, (c) 
giving rise to a number of hierarchical levels, (d) which exhibit common behaviors, (e) 
across disciplines.25 
 
          
Figure 6.  Characteristics of Complex Systems. 
 
                                                 
23 Anderson, “Complexity Theory,” 216.  
24 Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Response to Terrorism,” 40.  
25 Idiagram, “Characteristics of Complex Systems, Visual Modeling & Facilitation for Complex 
Business Problems, http://www.idiagram.com/examples/complexity.html [Accessed July 18,2007]. 
 18
Complementing this understanding of network dynamics, the field of social 
network analysis has been identified by Steve Ressler as the key to network knowledge 
which unlocks a system to overcome similarly designed terror networks.26  Ressler 
further asserts that open and decentralized networks supply more diversity of knowledge 
and information, so that ultimately the network becomes more important than the 
individual.27 In parallel fashion to complexity theory, Anderson points out that in 
complex systems the whole of the system can be greater than the sum of the parts.28  
Albert-Lazlo Barabasi defines networks as individual nodes connected by 
complex but understandable relationships and claims networks are the prerequisite for 
describing any complex system.29 All networks differ in size and shape but their genesis 
is categorized in one of three primary types: the chain network, the star or hub network, 
or the all-channel network.30 
In the all-channel network, each of the nodes is linked, strongly or loosely, to 
every other node in the network.31 Resiliency is inherent in this network structure as the 
loss of any given node theoretically does not have a cascading negative effect. The 
downside to this structure is that it is identified as difficult to organize and sustain.32  
Sustaining the effectiveness of the network, Anderson argues, is accomplished by  
balancing flexibility and stability.33 Even with its difficulties of organization and 
sustainability, the all-channel network is particularly well suited to meet the needs of a 
collaborative effort.34 
                                                 
26 Steve Ressler, “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present and 
Future Research,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006), http://www.hsaj.org:2  [Accessed 
October 2006].    
27 Ibid. 
28 Anderson, “Complexity Theory,” 224. 
29 Albert-Lazio Barabasi, Linked: The New Science of Networks (New York: Perseus, 2002):  
30 John Arquilla and David Ronfelt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy 
(Washington D.C.:RAND, 2001):6. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars. 9. 
33 Anderson, “Complexity Theory,” 224. 
34  Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 9 
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Given this basis, the goal of a functional homeland security preparedness 
collaborative can be achieved with networks of agencies and personnel working together 
in nonlinear approaches. According to Anderson, these systems are considered non-linear 
because their participants change inputs to outputs via a web of feedback loops.35 This is 
consistent with what Comfort defines as auto-adaptive “systems of interacting units, each 
performing at its own rate but adjusting that performance to that of its near-neighbors in 
response to incoming information from the environment.”36   
According to David Snowden, studying the past to determine the future (i.e., 
focusing on traditional strategic planning or behavioral control systems) can make a 
system more vulnerable to threat and less open to opportunities.37 When managing 
complex adaptive systems Christopher Bellavita suggests a more effective approach of: 
(1) setting boundaries, (2) creating attractors, (3) stabilizing desirable patterns, and (4) 
disrupting undesirable patterns.38 Failure to appreciate this point can lead many well-
intentioned people to waste large amounts of time and energy slogging through 
incremental bureaucracy and grasping for control through excessive use of rules.39   
Lastly, designing an interagency preparedness system that resembles the structure 
of the response effort adds another facet to the complexity. This factor of similarity in 
design between preparedness and response structures has been identified by Michael 
Wermuth of the RAND Corporation as a key component of preparedness efficiency and 
effectiveness.40 Every region across the country employs a slightly different response 
profile due to the limited lifetimes of (a) political relationships, (b) agreements like 
automatic and mutual aid, and even (c) jurisdictional boundaries and governance 
                                                 
35 Anderson, “Complexity Theory,” 224.  
36 Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Response,”  48.  
37 Lisa Roner, "Knowledge Management in an Unordered World," 
http://www.eyeforpharma.com/index.asp?news=38182  [Accessed July 22, 2007]. 
38 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security, Shape Patterns not Programs,” Homeland Security 
Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 2006),15, http://www.hsaj.org [Accessed July 22, 2007]. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Michael A Wermuth, “Emergency Preparedness in California,” Testimony to the Little Hoover Commission, 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 8. 
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structures. As a result of this vacillation, response and preparedness networks should be 
viewed as dynamic and complex, rather than static. 
C. COLLABORATION MEASUREMENT 
The pool of research on the measurement of collaborative capacity in homeland 
security preparedness efforts is currently very small. An argument could be made that 
with an analytical tool to measure the collaborative capacity of one’s agency, more 
effective steps could be taken to bolster the collaborative capacity of said agency. This 
argument has been proffered by Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen in their research report 
Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland Security.41 Their conceptual model and 
diagnostic process forms the basis for the methodology used for this thesis research.  
Theirs is the only tool for measuring collaborative capacity that was uncovered in 
this literature review. Through a series of interviews with homeland security 
professionals, Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen identified the following five dimensions as 
contributing to collaborative capacity and then categorized respective sub-dimension 
enablers and inhibitors: 
1. Strategy and Purpose 
2. Structure 
3. Lateral Mechanisms 
4. Incentives and Motivation  
5. People and People Processes 
 
 “Strategy and Purpose” enablers include a commonly felt need, or perceived risk, 
combined with a willingness to adapt the collaborative effort to the needs and interests of 
other participating organizations. “Structural” enablers include the formal power and 
authority of those engaged in an interagency collaboration. “Lateral Mechanisms” center 
on the enablers of social capital, effective communications, and technical interoperability. 
“Incentives” include enablers such as increased resources, career incentives, and  
 
                                                 
41 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland Security,” i. 
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leadership commitment. Finally, “People and People Processes” include factors such as 
commitment, an appreciation for others’ perspectives, power sharing, conflict 
management skills, and trust.42  
The diagnostic tool is designed to be utilized through a feedback process allowing 
organizations to self-examine and identify appropriate interventions to improve their 
collaborative capacity. It is its presence or absence that classifies any characteristic as an 
enabler or inhibitor. Collecting data from organizational members regarding the degree to 
which these capabilities are present allows a prescriptive analysis to be made of the 
organizations’ collaborative capacity. This process is reflected in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Developing Organizational Design Dynamics to Improve Collaborative 
Capacity. 
 
A strength of the model is the way in which it complements other existing 
theories. While social network analysis is a well-established technique in organizational 
science, most other social science studies examine the presence or absence of a particular 
type of attribute between members.43 By looking across the identified collaborative 
capacity dimensions, the tool described by Hocevar, et al. simultaneously examines 
                                                 
42 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland Security,” 6-7.  
43Mark S. Mizruchi, “Social Network Analysis: Recent Achievements and Current Controverersies,” 
Acta Sociologica 37 (1994): 329-343. 
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dozens of collaboration-enabling characteristics to come to an actionable conclusion. 
Furthermore, when overlaid with complexity theory and the study of complex adaptive 
systems as mentioned above, this tool offers a mechanism for the examination of network 
behavioral evolution. This becomes critical as network behavioral evolution must be 
understood to begin to predict the behavior of complex adaptive systems. 44  
In a similar fashion, this tool adds to the value of other purely social science 
theories. For example, Jeff Weiss and Jonathan Hughes view the key to collaboration as 
acknowledging and managing conflict. They recommend devising and implementing a 
common method for resolving conflict that is made a part of everyday business. So, if 
conflict resolution was identified by the collaborative capacity audit as an inhibitor to a 
system’s collaborative capacity, Weiss and Hughes’ conflict strategies could then be used 
to develop methodologies for improved conflict management. 45  
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Emergency preparedness should be based on an all-hazard approach that fully 
integrates all responder disciplines.46 The traditional hierarchical organizational structure 
of responder disciplines does not equip those same responders to function in a networked 
collaborative environment. The requisite transformation to an open and decentralized 
network structure is possible, but not probable, without a well-constructed plan of 
action.47    
Richard Beckhard and Reuben Harris recognize that “change is not a neat and 
linear process.”48 They further assert that the first step in initiating an organizational 
change is that of defining the need for change. This point is critical in gaining the 
                                                 
44 Anderson, “Complexity Theory,” 217.  
45 Jeff Weiss and Johathan Hughes. ”Want Collaboration? Accept – and Actively Manage – Conflict,”  
Harvard Business Review  Online Version (March 2005), 2-9, http://harvardbusiness 
online.hbsp.harvard.edu/b01/en/hbr/hbrsa/curren [Accessed March 12, 2007]. 
46 Wermuth, “Emergency Preparedness in California,”  6. 
47 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Business Review 
(March-April 1995): 59 
48 Richard Beckhard and Reuben T. Harris, Organizational Transitions, Managing Complex Change 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wessley Publishing, 1987), 30. 
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participating agencies’ buy-in to the value of the process. As all homeland security 
incidents exceed the capacity of any one agency, discipline, or level of governance, the 
need for change from a hierarchical structure to a collaborative system cannot be 
understated.  
In the case of homeland security preparedness, this need for change has been 
trumpeted by the failures in the wake of nationally historic incidents. These events 
demonstrated the necessity to change the approach to preparedness or risk continued 
ineffectiveness.49 In the homeland security public safety environment this ineffectiveness 
readily translates into life and death, as vividly demonstrated in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina. 
Even in the face of this compelling argument, Donahue and Tuohy have 
documented that there continues to be an aversion to organizational change in the 
homeland security preparedness environment. They found that field leadership from 
around the country cited a conscious disregard for collaboration stemming from a myriad 
of reasons including: (a) ineffective leadership, (b) lack of commitment resulting from a 
lack of trust and inadequate knowledge of interdisciplinary capabilities, (c) poor 
communications, and (d) poor planning leading to resource allocation issues.
50
  
Similar barriers to collaboration were found by Jerome Hagen in his master’s 
thesis, “Interagency Collaboration Challenges among Homeland Security Disciplines in 
Urban Areas.” Hagen states that some agencies just “go through the motions” without 
real commitment to the process or meaningful participation.51  
If public agencies can acknowledge the need for change from a hierarchical 
structure to a networked collaborative, a strategy must be chosen for change. Kotter and 
Schlesinger point out that organizational change efforts based on inconsistent strategies 
tend to run into predictable difficulties. Examples of this include efforts that are not 
                                                 
49 John P. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change,” Harvard Business 
Review (March-April 1995): 112. 
50 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don't Learn,” 6-7. 
51 Jerome D. Hagen, “Interagency Collaboration Challenges Among Homeland Security Disciplines in 
Urban Areas” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006) 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/theses/06Mar_Hagen.pdf (Accessed September 12, 2006). 
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thoroughly planned in advance, yet are implemented quickly, and tend to become bogged 
down due to unanticipated problems. Also, efforts that involve a large number of people, 
but are implemented quickly, usually become either stalled or less participative.52  This 
same point is underscored by Harold Sirkin, Preey Keenan, and Alan Jackson as they 
have used predictable factors to guide the execution of more than 1,000 change 
management programs. Their research identifies the following predictable factors as 
determinant to a change effort’s success: 
 
Duration 
This factor includes the length of the change project and how often formal 
project reviews occur. Shorter projects with more frequent reviews, 
occurring ≤ every 2 months, are statistically more successful.  
 
Integrity of Performance 
This factor includes the capability of the team leader and the skills and 
motivations of the team members. Additionally this factor considers if the 
team has enough time to spend on the project.  
 
Commitment 
This factor looks at two types of commitment, the commitment of senior 
management and local level commitment. Senior management 
commitment is measured in the amount of and strength of communications 
utilized to convey the change message. Local level commitment looks to 
those most affected by the change, their understanding of the needed 
change and their beliefs that the effort is worthwhile.  
 
Effort 
This factor looks to the percentage of increased effort that employees must 
undertake to implement the change. 53 
 
It stands to reason that an interagency collaborative undertaking should be insured 
of every chance for success. John Kotter, of the Harvard School of Business, claims that a 
change process goes through a series of phases that, without methodical planning, 
account for the top eight reasons why transformational efforts fail: 
                                                 
52 John P. Kotter and Leonard A. Schlesinger, “Choosing Strategies for Change,” Harvard Business 
Review (March-April 1979): 112. 
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1. Not establishing great enough urgency. 
2. Wrong (not powerful enough) players in the coalition. 
3. Lack of vision. 
4. Too little communication by a factor of 10.  
5. Not removing obstacles. 
6. Not systematically planning for creating short term wins.  
7. Declaring victory too soon. 
8. Not anchoring the change into corporate culture. 54 
 
Even when accounting for the phases mentioned above, Kotter points out that the 
change process is extremely complex and time consuming, and that skipping steps in the 
process may create the illusion of speed but never produces a satisfying result. 
Additionally, making critical mistakes in any of the phases can have catastrophic 
consequences to the process, negating hard won gains.55  
Again, to date, there has been little in the research on collaboration to guide 
change efforts. There have also been few documented field examples that demonstrate 
how sources of resistance have been addressed or provide sufficient examples to 
encourage broader engagement in interagency collaboration.  This case study is intended 
to provide an example of a regional all-hazards process that can be duplicated by any 
authority to initiate robust interagency collaboration among strategic and tactical partners 
to meet homeland security preparedness needs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
53 Harold L. Sirkin, Preey Keenan, and Alan Jackson, “The Hard Side of Change Management,” in 
Harvard Business Review on Leading Through Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School 
Publishing Corporation, 2006), 141-166. 
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III.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This research effort focused on three Regional Collaborative Networks that 
function as a portion of a larger homeland security preparedness system, a preparedness 
web. These regional collaborative networks were examined to answer the following 
research questions: (1) How and why were the regional collaborative networks 
established? (2) What is the collaborative capacity of the preparedness web system? (3) 
What potential collaborative improvements can be identified with the system?  
To answer these questions, both qualitative and quantitative approaches were 
required. The methodology took two forms: (1) an electronic survey was conducted of the 
network participants, and (2) personal interviews were conducted with key informants 
involved in the formation of the networks. 
B. THE QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
1.  Participants  
All of the current participants in the three case-study Regional Collaborative 
Networks were asked to participate in the quantitative survey process. The networks 
surveyed included The Consortium of Technical Responders (N=33), the Tactical 
Commanders Network (N=22), and the Operational Area Counsel (N=12). These 
networks are comprised of representatives from twenty-four local agencies, three state 
agencies, and five federal agencies. Interagency representation is shown by network in 
Chapter One, Subsection C – Background, Tables 2, 3, and 4.  
2.  Quantitative Measures  
Ultimately fifty-four survey items were selected from a database of collaborative 
capacity questions developed by Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen (2006) at the Naval 
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Postgraduate School. The questions were chosen from the following dimensions listed 
below, each of which is followed by an illustrative question from that dimension: 
• Strategy and Purpose (My home organization is able to balance our 
individual organizational goals with cross-agency (regional) requirements.) 
• Structure ([This network] invests significant time and energy to de-
conflict existing policies and processes that impede collaboration.) 
• Lateral Mechanisms (My home organization works with other agencies 
to identify lessons learned for improved collaboration.) 
• Incentives and Motivation ([This network] has experienced successful 
interagency collaboration in the past.) 
• People and People Processes (Members in my home organization are 
willing to share decision-making authority with other organizations when 
addressing interagency issues.) 
 
Additionally, the questions were selected for (a) applicability to either an agency 
or network aspect and (b) to include a range of sub-dimensions included in each of the 
major categories (e.g. under the dimension of Strategy and Purpose were the sub-
dimensions of felt need and  adaptability, amongst others).  
Each of the questions was given a 4-point scale for response (e.g. 1-strongly 
disagree, 2-disagree, 3-agree, 4-strongly agree) from which the results were evaluated. 
For the four questions that were negatively worded (e.g. A history of competition and 
conflict affects [this network’s] interagency capability), the results were re-coded to 
allow direct comparability of results (e.g. a mean of 2.0 for a negatively worded item was 
re-coded to 3.0). Each re-coded item is identified as such. 
Prior to distribution the survey was beta tested by three homeland security 
professionals in the Sacramento, California region to identify problems of clarity, visual 
layout, and the organization of questions. This assessment included the respondent taking 
the online version of the survey and recording the required time and unclear aspects of 
the tool. As a result of the beta test, these changes were made: 
• All “home agency” and “collaborative network” questions were grouped 
to eliminate changing focus back and forth with each new dimension. 
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• Survey dimension titles were eliminated as they served no role for the 
respondents. 
• The words “metrics” and “network” were replaced with layman’s terms. 
 
The survey was administered in an electronic format, using the research tool 
Survey Monkey, between May 8 and June 15, 2007. Sixty-seven participants were asked 
to answer the questions from two different perspectives; (1) from that of their own home 
agency, and (2) from the perspective of the Regional Collaborative Network in which 
they participate. The data generated from the first perspective would characterize the 
collaborative capacity of the system of organizations that participate in the preparedness 
web. The data generated from the second perspective would characterize the 
collaborative capacity of the specific networks. Of the surveys distributed, 70.1% were 
returned, for a total of forty-nine participants.  
3.  Quantitative Data Analysis 
The data were aggregated and summary statistics generated for the two points of 
reference described in the section above: (1) home organizations and (2) regional 
collaborative networks. This was done to focus the evaluation on the system of 
constituent organizations that participate in the preparedness web and the illustrative set 
of networks comprising the web. The purpose of the research is not to compare networks, 
but to present an aggregate description of the preparedness web and the organizations it 
represents. Trends were examined across and between each of the survey dimensions for 
the home agencies and the networks to identify their strongest collaborative 
characteristics and the potential opportunities for improvement. Statistical data was 
analyzed utilizing Microsoft Excel. 
C. THE QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
Five interviews were conducted with the persons involved in the formation of two 
of the Regional Collaborative Networks: the Consortium of Technical Responders (CTR) 
and the Tactical Commanders Network (TCN). The interviews were conducted for the 
purpose of ascertaining how and why the networks were developed.  
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1. Participants 
All interview participants were selected as a result of their direct involvement in 
the networks’ initiation processes. Each identified interviewee was then contacted by 
telephone by the author to request their participation (to which all agreed). A listing of 
the interview participants by job function and employer is presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Interview Participants by Network. 
Consortium of Technical Responders Home Agency 
Battalion Chief – Special Operations Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District 
Battalion Chief – Special Operations Roseville City Fire Department 
Battalion Chief – Former Haz-Mat Coordinator Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District 
Tactical Commanders Network  
Lieutenant-Cmdr. – Regional Terrorism Threat 
Assessment Center  
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office 
Captain – Haz - Mat Coordinator Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District 
 
2. Interview Protocol 
The interview protocol was constructed with the goal of gaining a better 
understanding of how and why the collaborative networks were established. This semi-
structured protocol included questions addressing the dimensions of: 
• Strategy, Purpose, Leadership, Goals and Values 
• Network Structure 
• Lateral Mechanisms 
• Incentives and Motivation 
• People and People Processes 
 




Table 6. Protocol for Consortium of Technical Responders and Tactical Commanders 





[Introduce myself.]  All information is non-attributional.  Data will be scrubbed, coded, and summarized.  
We’re studying interagency collaboration, hoping to learn more about how interagency efforts begin and 
develop over time. I understand you are part of the Consortium of Technical Responders/Tactical 
Commanders Network.  The questions I’ll ask will help me learn about the initiation and development of 
the network. 
 
• Describe the current collaborative effort. How is it structured?  What is its purpose? Draw a diagram.  
DESCRIPTION 
• What initiated this collaboration?  PURPOSE AND STRATEGY 
• Who were the key leaders at the start of the effort?  LEADERS 
• In what way did they contribute to the success of the effort?  Pose challenges? 
• What do you see as the primary outcomes or benefits of this collaboration? OUTCOMES 
• Are these outcomes measured or documented?  If so, how? 
• Have the benefits/outcomes changed over the history of the effort. 
• Were existing structures (committees, groups) used in the initial effort? Have they been modified?  
FORMAL STRUCTURE 
• Are there established procedures?  Which are most critical to the collaboration?  Why and how were 
they developed?  How much adaptation of org policies, procedures, processes have been necessary to 
achieve IA collaboration? 
• How is the interagency network linked to the home organizations?  How informed are the home 
organizations about the workings of the interagency team? How do they stay informed? LATERAL 
MECHANISM, LINKAGES 
• What existing relationships were important to the startup of the IA effort?  How have relationships 
been established? 
• To what extent did senior leadership support the collaboration? How was it demonstrated?  Has it 
changed over time? How was/is it demonstrated?  INCENTIVES 
• What is the motivation for those who are involved?  For those who are not leaders, what are their 
motivations?  MOTIVATION 
• What are the key skills or characteristics necessary for those working in the collaboration?  How are 
they developed?  How have these changed over time?  How do you select people for roles in the 
TACN?  Is rank or position a consideration? PEOPLE AND PEOPLE PROCESSES 
• How well do members of your organization understand the capabilities and requirements of the other 
organizations in the network?  How has this understanding been developed?  KNOWLEDGE OF 





3. Interview Process 
All of the interviews were conducted by Dr. Gail Thomas of the Naval 
Postgraduate School on June 11, 2007. This third-party interviewer was used to maintain 
objectivity as the author of this thesis was also an interviewee. Each interview lasted 
approximately one hour. Two interviews were conducted at Roseville Fire Station #1 
(Roseville, CA) and three interviews were conducted at the Sacramento Regional Office 
of Homeland Security (McClellan, CA). The variation of locations was based on the 
availability for response (on-duty) requirements of the participants. All interviews were 
digitally recorded.  
4. Qualitative Data Analysis 
After the interviews were completed, each of the recordings was transcribed. 
Following transcription, each interview was hand coded. Given the research questions, 
three themes were pre-identified in the coding sequence: (1) how the networks were 
established, (2) why the networks were established, and (3) recommendations for other 
agencies considering a similar effort. The coded interviews were then compared to the 
others within their respective Regional Collaborative Network for thematic trends. At this 
time other themes emerged from the data including: (4) inhibitors encountered, (5) 
history of collaboration in the region, and (6) successes since implementation. Finally, 
the summaries of the thematic analysis for the two Regional Collaborative Networks 
were evaluated against each other to identify systemic trends regarding the development 
of these networks. 
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IV. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the quantitative results of the analysis of the survey data. 
The chapter is broken into three sections: (1) a summary of the collaborative capacity 
assessment of the “Home Organizations,” (2) a summary of the collaborative capacity of 
the three regional collaborative networks combined, and (3) a side-by-side comparison of 
the nineteen identical survey items asked of the respondents about both their home 
organizations and their respective networks. The first two sections will begin with an 
overview of the survey findings and then report by dimension (Strategy and Purpose, 
Structure, Lateral Mechanisms, Incentives, and People and People Processes). For each 
dimension, collaborative capacity strengths are reported and opportunities for 
improvement are identified. 
The following criteria were used to evaluate the mean ratings for each survey 
question: 
• The weakest characteristics – mean ≤ 2.5 
• Moderate characteristics – mean = 2.6 to 3.1 
• Strongest characteristics – mean ≥ 3.2 
In the tables below the mean and standard deviation is listed for each individual survey 
item and the items are organized by dimension. 
1. Overall Home Organization Findings 
The home organizations are a critical starting point in the evaluation of the overall 
regional system; as the capacity of groups depends on the capacity of its individuals, so 
do the capacities of interagency partnerships depend on the collaborative capacity of each 
individual organization.56 
                                                 
56 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacity,” 75. 
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An overall list of questions with associated means and standard deviations for the 
respondents’ home organizations is provided in Appendix C. A detailed discussion of 
findings, broken down by survey dimensions, follows this section.  
The survey respondents reported that their constituent organizations possess, by 
and large, a relatively moderate collaborative capacity. Overall, 11% of the 
characteristics measured were reported as weak, 64% were reported as moderate, and 
25% were reported as strong.  
The strongest characteristics (mean ≥3.2) across dimensions of the home 
organizations are shown in Table 7. Interestingly, they come from every dimension 
except Structure. In evaluating the individual items listed in this table, a theme emerges 
of a desire to reach outside of the organization to meet their requisite needs. This theme is 
supported by: (a) considerations of the interests and goals of other agencies in the region, 
(b) strong information sharing, and (c) a history of successful collaboration fostering 
respect for others and supported by agency leadership.  
Table 7. Strongest Characteristics of Case Study Home Organizations. 
Strategy & Purpose  
My home organization considers the interests of other agencies in our planning.* 
3.2      
(0.5) 
My home organization is willing to address cross-agency goals.* 
3.4      
(0.6) 
Inter-agency collaboration is a high priority for my home organization.* 
3.3      
(0.7) 
Lateral Mechanisms  
My home organization provides other agencies adequate access to information we have that is 
relevant to their work.* 
3.2      
(0.6) 
People in my home organization actively engage in exchanges with counterparts in other 
organizations. *   
3.3      
(0.6) 
Incentives - Motivation and Leadership  
My home organization has experienced successful inter-agency collaboration in the past. *  
3.3      
(0.5) 
To what extent does leadership support collaboration in your home organization? ** 
3.2      
(0.9) 
People and People Processes  
Members in my home organization respect the expertise of those in other organizations with 
whom we have to work. *   
3.3      
(0.4) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
**  4 point scale; 1-Rarely to 4-Almost Always 
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The weakest characteristics (mean ≤ 2.5) across dimensions of the home 
organizations are shown in Table 8. Two of the items listed – a lack of measurement 
criteria in place to identify organizational-level benefits of collaboration and a lack of 
training in place to develop collaborative skills – understandably may not have been 
immediate priorities within the home organizations upon the initiation of collaborative 
efforts. This being said, for a region with such a long history of collaborative efforts the 
lack of these characteristics is notable. The third item, collaborative activities being 
added on top of regular workload, leaves the possibility of personnel “burn out” due to 
the collateral duties. Also, and just as importantly, this item leaves a possibility of putting 
aside the collateral collaborative duties when faced with an overwhelming amount of 
“regular” duties (for example, in a time of crisis). 
 
Table 8. Weakest Characteristics of Case Study Home Organizations. 
Structure  
My home organization has measurement criteria in place that evaluate the organizational level 
benefits of collaboration.* 
2.3       
(0.7) 
Incentives  
In my home organization, collaborative activities and responsibilities are added on top of our 
regular work load. *  
1.8**     
(0.6) 
People and People Processes  
My home organization has training in place to develop collaborative skills (e.g., conflict 
management, team process skills).  * 
2.3       
(0.7) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
** Recoded value to allow direct comparability 
 
2.  Home Organization Findings by Dimension 
The following discussion presents major findings of the survey questions 
regarding the collaborative capacity of “home organizations.” Results are organized 
according to the dimensions of collaborative capacity as identified by Hocevar, Thomas 
and Jansen. Each section presents the existing strengths and opportunities for 
improvement. The percentages for collaboration characteristic classifications (e.g. weak, 
moderate, or strong) are provided with each table by dimension.  
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a. Strategy and Purpose 
In the dimension of Strategy and Purpose, the survey results show 60% of 
the characteristics as strong in the following sub-dimensions: the region’s adaptability to 
the interests of other organizations; the willingness to address regional goals; and the felt 
need for collaboration. The remaining 40% of items were rated as moderate, including 
the willingness to commit resources to the collaborative effort and an ability to balance 
individual agency needs with regional concerns. Consideration should be given to 
including these last two items in areas for potential improvement, but more research may 
be needed to definitively make that decision. Overall, the data indicates a positive 
response by respondents regarding their home organizations’ efforts in these areas, with 
all mean ≥ 3.0 as depicted in Table 9.   
 
Table 9. Strategy and Purpose / Home Agency.  
                                 Weak - 0% / Moderate – 40% / Strong – 60%  
My home organization considers the interests of other agencies in our planning.* 
3.2       
(0.5) 
My home organization is willing to address cross-agency goals.* 
3.4       
(0.6) 
Inter-agency collaboration is a high priority for my home organization.* 
3.3       
(0.7) 
My home organization is willing to invest resources to accomplish cross-agency goals.* 
3.1       
(0.7) 
My home organization is able to balance our individual organizational goals with cross agency 
(regional) requirements.* 
3.0       
(0.7) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
 
b. Structure 
In the dimension of Structure, 75% of the sub-dimensions were rated as 
moderate, including (a) flexibility and adaptability, (b) de-conflicting policies and 
procedures, and (c) formalization of roles and responsibilities. Within this dimension, the 
remaining 25% were rated as weak capabilities under a sub-dimension of formal controls 
(as represented by measurement criteria for evaluating the benefits of collaboration). This 
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last item presents a significant opportunity for improvement. Without understanding the 
organizational-level benefits of collaboration, it is possible that the home organizations 
could withdraw support for beneficial programs.  
 
Table 10. Structure / Home Agency. 
                                   Weak - 25% / Moderate – 75% / Strong –0%  
My home organization is willing to adapt procedures to meet the requirements of other 
organizations with which we do inter-agency work. * 
3.1       
(0.6) 
My home organization invests significant time and energy to de-conflict existing policies and 
processes that impede collaboration. * 
2.9       
(0.7) 
My home organization has developed an understanding of our interagency roles and 
responsibilities.*  
3.0       
(0.6) 
My home organization has measurement criteria in place that evaluate the organizational level 
benefits of collaboration.* 
2.3       
(0.7) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
 
c. Lateral Mechanisms 
In the dimension of Lateral Mechanisms, a trend materializes in evaluation 
of the highest and lowest mean ratings of the eleven items surveyed. The highest rated 
items (all with a mean ≥ 3.1) focused on the willingness and ability to share information. 
The lowest rated items (all with a mean ≤2.7) focused on the willingness to commit 
financial resources to meet this end. This may suggest that the agencies’ support of 
collaborative efforts could possibly wane or cease to exist if the costs were to escalate.  
That being said, the overall returns of the dimension were still quite positive, as indicated 











Table 11. Lateral Mechanisms / Home Agency. 
Weak - 0% / Moderate – 82% / Strong –18%  
My home organization supports the decisions and recommendations of the inter-agency team. * 
3.0       
(0.6) 
My home organization commits adequate human and financial resources to training with our 
inter-agency partners. *   
2.7       
(0.8) 
My home organization gives members of the inter-agency team adequate authority to speak on 
behalf of the organization. *  
3.0       
(0.6) 
My home organization has strong norms that encourage sharing information with other 
agencies. *   
3.1       
(0.6) 
My home organization invests time and resources to become familiar with the capabilities and 
requirements of our partner organizations. *   
2.7       
(0.6) 
My home organization is flexible in adapting our procedures to better fit with those of partner 
organizations.  *  
2.8       
(0.6) 
My home organization provides other agencies adequate access to information we have that is 
relevant to their work.* 
3.2       
(0.6) 
My home organization works with other agencies to identify lessons learned for improved 
collaboration.*   
3.0       
(0.6) 
My home organization makes necessary investments in the infrastructure for collaboration.*   
2.7       
(0.7) 
People in my home organization actively engage in exchanges with counterparts in other 
organizations. *   
3.3       
(0.6) 
My home organization has the technical interoperability to enable effective inter-agency 
collaboration. *  
3.1       
(0.7) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
 
d. Incentives 
A relatively positive reflection of the incentives dimension is 
demonstrated by only one (17%) of the items being rated as weak, 50% of the sub-
dimensions being rated as moderate, and the remaining 33% being rated as strong (see 
Table 12). Interestingly, the history and support indicated for these efforts has not 
changed the fact that collaborative efforts are still seen as being “above and beyond” the 
respondent’s normal workload rather than institutionalized into that workload. This 
characteristic presents a significant opportunity for system improvement to mitigate the 
potential for individual “burn out” or the possibility of respondent commitment to the 
process fluctuating with the demands of the “regular” workload.   
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Table 12 . Incentives / Home Agency. 
Weak - 17% / Moderate – 50% / Strong –33%    
A history of competition and conflict affects my home organization's interagency capability.*   
   
2.7***    
(0.7) 
My home organization has experienced successful interagency collaboration in the past.*   
3.3       
(0.5) 
In my home organization, collaborative activities and responsibilities are added on top of our 
regular work load.  * 
   
1.8***    
(0.6) 
To what extent does leadership support collaboration in your home organization? **  
3.2       
(0.9) 
My home organization saves on costs of technology and equipment by collaborating with other 
agencies. *       
2.7       
(0.9) 
A significant motivation for my home organizations involvement in interagency collaboration is 
the opportunity for outside funding. *   
2.7       
(0.8) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
** 4 point scale; 1-Almost Never to 4-Almost Always 
*** Recoded value to allow direct comparability 
 
e. People and People Processes 
Several enablers in the area of people and people processes are identified 
in the assessment of the home organizations’ collaborative capacity. The items with 
moderate or strong means included (a) knowledge of other agencies’ capabilities, (b) 
communication, (c) inter-agency trust and respect, and (d) conflict management. Further 
research should examine conflict management for a potential opportunity for 
improvement.  One clearly identified opportunity for system improvement was the fairly 
low rating (mean = 2.3) as to the availability of collaborative skill development training.  
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Table 13. People and People Processes / Home Agency. 
Weak - 14% / Moderate – 71% / Strong –14%**  
Members of my home organization are aware of the capabilities of other organizations with 
which we work. *   
2.9       
(0.6) 
People in my home organization are unwilling to share information with others.  * 
   
3.1***    
(0.6) 
Members in my home organization are willing to share decision making authority with other 
organizations when addressing interagency issues.*   
2.9       
(0.6) 
Members in my home organization respect the expertise of those in other organizations with 
whom we have to work.*    
3.3       
(0.4) 
My home organization manages conflict well. *   
2.7       
(0.7) 
My home organization has training in place to develop collaborative skills (e.g., conflict 
management, team process skills).  * 
2.3       
(0.7) 
People in my home organization tend to be suspicious and distrustful of our counterparts in 
other organizations.*   
   
2.8***    
(0.6) 
*  4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree  
** Does not equate to100% due to rounding. 
*** Recoded value to allow direct comparability  
 
3. Overall Regional Collaborative Network Findings 
The respondents’ view of collaborative capacity within their home organizations 
was greatly surpassed by their estimation of their respective networks’ collaborative 
capacity. Overall, only 3% of the collaboration characteristics measured were reported as 
weak, 38% were reported as moderate, and 59% were reported as strong. There are two 
possible explanations for these relatively high ratings: (1) as collaboration is the purpose 
of these networks they do in fact have a high collaborative capacity (while collaboration 
is only one aspect of the work of the home organizations) or (2) the survey instrument is 
not currently sensitive enough to pick up on limitations in the collaborative capacity of 
participating networks. Only one item showed a weak score with a mean = 2.5, but when 
coupled with the weak scores reported from the home organizations, it is assumed that 
the survey instrument is in fact sensitive enough to differentiate the data. Additional 
research efforts utilizing this tool will be needed to validate that contention.  
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An overall list of questions with associated means and standard deviations for the 
respondent’s networks is provided in Appendix D. Following this section a detailed 
discussion of findings, broken down by survey dimension, is provided.  
The strongest features (mean ≥3.2) across dimensions for all regional 
collaborative networks are shown in Table 14. Interestingly, as with the results of the 
home organization data, the strongest characteristics come from every dimension other 
than Structure. These strongest characteristics included: information sharing, adaptability, 
a history of collaboration, felt need, shared vision, interagency capability awareness, 
conflict management, and an increased trust in and respect for interagency partners.  
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Table 14. System Strengths Across Regional Collaborative Networks. 
Strategy & Purpose   
Interagency collaboration is a high priority for [this network].* 
3.5            
(0.7) 
[This networks] participants are able to balance individual organizational goals with 
cross-agency (regional) requirements.** 
3.2            
(0.8) 
[This network] has contributed to the creation of a shared vision for interagency 
collaboration on a regional basis. * 
3.3            
(0.5) 
Lateral Mechanisms   
[This network] has strong norms that encourage sharing information with other 
agencies. *   
3.4            
(0.5) 
[This network] is flexible in adapting our procedures to better fit with those of partner 
organizations.*    
3.2            
(0.5) 
[This network] has adequate access to needed information from other agencies. *   
3.2            
(0.6) 
[This network] works with other agencies to identify lessons learned for improved 
collaboration. *  
3.3            
(0.5) 
People in [this network] actively engage in exchanges with counterparts in other 
organizations. *   
3.4            
(0.5) 
Incentives - Motivation and Leadership   
[This network] has experienced successful interagency collaboration in the past.*   
3.4            
(0.5) 
People and People Processes   
Members of [this network] are aware of the capabilities of other organizations with 
which we work.*    
3.2            
(0.5) 
People in [this network] are unwilling to share information with others.*   
   3.2***        
(0.8) 
Members in [this network] respect the expertise of those in other organizations with 
whom we have to work. *   
3.3            
(0.6) 
Members in [this network] manage conflict well.*    
3.2            
(0.6) 
People in [this network] tend to be suspicious and distrustful of our counterparts in 
other organizations. *  
   3.2***        
(0.6) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
**  4 point scale; 1-Rarely to 4-Almost Always 
*** Recoded value to allow direct comparability 
 
There was only one item with a mean rated as “weak” (relative mean ≤ 2.5) across 
all dimensions of the regional collaborative networks (see Table 15). The item listed – a 
lack of training in place to develop collaborative skills – understandably may not have 
been at the top of the “to do” list upon network initiation, but it will affect the longevity 
of the network process.  
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Table 15.  Weakest Characteristics of Case Study Regional Collaborative Networks. 
People and People Processes   
[This network] has training in place to develop collaborative skills (e.g., conflict 
management, team process skills). *  
2.5            
(0.5)   
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
 
4. Regional Collaborative Network Findings by Dimension 
The following discussion presents major findings of survey questions regarding 
the collaborative capacity across the regional collaborative networks. Results are 
organized according to the dimensions of collaborative capacity (e.g. Strategy and 
Purpose, Structure, Lateral Mechanisms, Incentives, People and People Processes). Each 
section presents the existing strengths and opportunities for improvement. The 
percentages for collaboration characteristic classifications (e.g. weak (mean ≤ 2.5), 
moderate (mean = 2.6 to 3.1), or strong (mean ≥ 3.2)) are provided with each table by 
dimension. 
a. Strategy and Purpose 
The strongest collaboration enablers of the Strategy and Purpose 
dimension lie in the sub-dimensions of (a) felt need and (b) a shared vision of meeting 
regional needs (see Table 16). It is puzzling that the characteristic of goal clarity received 
a moderate rating, as it seems that clear goals would be a necessary part of establishing 
these networks. Goal clarification, if needed, could perhaps facilitate important advances 
in the existing networked system.  
Table 16. Strategy and Purpose / Regional Collaborative Networks. 
Weak - 0% / Moderate – 25% / Strong –75%  
Interagency collaboration is a high priority for [this network].* 
3.5            
(0.7) 
[This networks] participants are able to balance individual organizational goals with 
cross agency (regional) requirements.** 
3.2            
(0.8) 
[This network] has clearly established goals for interagency collaboration.* 
2.9            
(0.7) 
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[This network] has contributed to the creation of a shared vision for interagency 
collaboration on a regional basis.*  
3.3            
(0.5) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
**  4 point scale; 1-Rarely to 4-Almost Always 
b. Structure 
In the dimension of Structure, moderately strong capabilities were 
reported for the sub-dimensions of (a) flexibility and adaptability, (b) de-conflicting 
policies and procedures, and (c) role clarity/formalization. The moderately high scores 
reflected in Table 17 do not necessarily mean there is no possible room for improvement 
in this dimension of the regional collaborative network system; with all “moderate” 
ratings, all of these aspects of collaboration could be examined for ways to improve 
effectiveness.  
Table 17. Structure / Regional Collaborative Networks. 
Weak - 0% / Moderate – 100% / Strong –0%  
[This network] is willing to adapt procedures to meet the requirements of other 
organizations with which we do interagency work.*  
3.1            
(0.4) 
[This network] invests significant time and energy to de-conflict existing policies and 
processes that impede collaboration. * 
3.1            
(0.6) 
[This network] has developed an understanding of our interagency roles and 
responsibilities. * 
3.1            
(0.5) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
 
c. Lateral Mechanisms 
All of the results in the dimension of Lateral Mechanisms were 
consistently high (≥ 3.2) as well (Table 18). This speaks well of the sub-dimensions 
covered, including (a) culture of collaboration, (b) flexibility and adaptability, (c) 
information sharing, (d) social capital, and (e) sharing lessons learned in the regional 
collaborative networks.  Once again, further research would be needed to identify 
opportunities for improvement, as none were immediately identifiable.  
 45
Table 18. Lateral Mechanisms / Regional Collaborative Networks. 
Weak - 0% / Moderate – 0% / Strong –100%    
[This network] has strong norms that encourage sharing information with other 
agencies.*    
3.4            
(0.5) 
[This network] is flexible in adapting our procedures to better fit with those of partner 
organizations.*    
3.2            
(0.5) 
[This network] has adequate access to needed information from other agencies. *   
3.2            
(0.6) 
[This network] works with other agencies to identify lessons learned for improved 
collaboration.*   
3.3            
(0.5) 
People in [this network] actively engage in exchanges with counterparts in other 
organizations. *   
3.4            
(0.5) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
 
d. Incentives 
The results from the dimension of incentives were also strongly indicative 
of a high collaborative capacity, as depicted in Table 19. The sub-dimensions of (a) 
history of competition and (b) history of experience were examined and found to be 
strengths. Further research examining other aspects of incentives would be needed to 
definitively identify opportunities for improvements in this system.  
 
Table 19. Incentives / Regional Collaborative Networks. 
Weak - 0% / Moderate – 50% / Strong –50%   
A history of competition and conflict affects [this network] inter-agency capability.*   
2.0   
  3.0**         
(0.7) 
[This network] has experienced successful inter-agency collaboration in the past. *  
3.4            
(0.5) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
** Re-coded value to allow direct comparability 
 
e. People and People Processes 
As depicted in Table 20, five of the seven items were reported to be 
strengths of the regional collaborative network system, including the sub-dimensions of 
(a) appreciation of what other organizations bring to the shared problem; (b) adequacy of 
information sharing; (c) respect for other parties’ interests, expertise, roles, and 
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perspectives; (d) conflict management skills; and (e) trust. An identified area for 
improvement in the regional collaborative network process includes the implementation 
of increased training opportunities to develop collaborative skills with the goal of 
increasing the robustness and longevity of the system.  
 
Table 20. People and People Processes / Regional Collaborative Networks. 
Weak - 14% / Moderate – 14% / Strong –71%**   
Members of [this network] are aware of the capabilities of other organizations with 
which we work. *   
3.2            
(0.5) 
People in [this network] are unwilling to share information with others.*   
1.8    
   3.2***        
(0.8) 
Members in [this network] are willing to share decision making authority with other 
organizations when addressing interagency issues. *  
3.0            
(0.5) 
Members in [this network] respect the expertise of those in other organizations with 
whom we have to work. *   
3.3            
(0.6) 
Members in [this network] manage conflict well. *   
3.2            
(0.6) 
[This network] has training in place to develop collaborative skills (e.g., conflict 
management, team process skills).  * 
2.5           
(0.5)   
People in [this network] tend to be suspicious and distrustful of our counterparts in 
other organizations. *  
        1.8    
   3.2***        
(0.6) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
**  Does not equate to100% due to rounding. 
*** Re-coded value to allow direct comparability 
 
5.  Comparison between Home Organization and Regional Collaborative 
Networks on Identical Survey Items 
There were nineteen identical survey questions asked of both reference groups, 
the respondent’s home organization and their respective regional collaborative network.  
It is noteworthy that mean scores averaged 0.2 higher in favor of the collaborative 
capacity of the regional collaborative networks. While this difference is small, when 
differences appeared, they were consistently in favor of the networks. This may be 
explained by the fact that the home organizations are not solely focused on collaboration 
and collaboration is the primary function of the regional collaborative networks.  Given 
this distinction, the result may not necessarily be surprising, but the trend nonetheless 
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speaks to the collaborative functionality of the network system.  A complete listing of the 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 49
V. QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter answers the research question: “How and why were the Regional 
Collaborative Networks developed?” based on a thematic analysis of interviews with five 
of the people who initiated the Tactical Commanders Network (TCN) and the 
Consortium of Technical Responders (CTR). The TCN is a multidisciplinary group 
focused on preparedness for and consequence management of the traditional weapons of 
terrorism: guns and bombs.  The CTR is a multidisciplinary and multi-governance-level 
group focused upon preparedness for and consequence management of Chemical, 
Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) incidents.  Because the CTR 
and the TCN developed in a similar fashion, the analyses are integrated.  
B. NETWORK DEVELOPMENTAL FRAMEWORK 
The following framework (see Table 21) provides an overall thematic reflection 
on how and why the two networks came into being. Following each milestone is a brief 
narrative. In the second column a reference is provided linking the milestone to the sub-
dimensions of collaboration from the model of collaborative capacity developed by 
Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen.57 Following the overall framework is a more detailed 
examination of each item organized by perspective: (1) Phases of the Networks’ 
development, (2) Motivation for the development of the Networks, and (3) Outcomes 
from the Networks. 
 
                                                 
57 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacity.”  
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Table 21.  Network Developmental Framework. 
 Parallel From Collaborative 
Capacity Model 
Phases of the Networks’ Development  




Leadership: Permission was given, without specific direction, by 
visionary leaders in the regions fire services and law enforcement to 
pursue a new methodology to address needs. A history of collaboration in 
the region played a role in that decision process.  
• Leadership Support 
• Values 
• History – experience 
• Power Sharing 
• Culture 
Network Construction: Both networks were modeled after existing 
programs. Coincidentally both came from programs that originated in the 
Los Angeles, CA region. Personal relationships played a key role in the 
establishment of the networks. Formal meeting criteria established. 
• Social Capital 
• Network Ties 
• Trust 
• Formal Meetings 
Participant Selection: Network participants were selected for their 
particular disciplinary specialty providing they were powerful enough to 
speak for their agency. 
• Formal Authority 
• Skills Competency 
• Communication 
Mission Clarification: Interagency mission based on local standardized 
risk assessments allowing efficient vulnerability management and 
coordinated planning. These were sold to participants via differing 
methodologies but with same buy in. 
• Shared Vision 
• Planning 
• Information Sharing 
• Role Clarity 
Overcome Resistance: Political resistance encountered tied to 
“traditional” thoughts of participants. Financial resistance encountered 
with competing grant funding and annual budgets. Process stabilization 
issues encountered without organizational mandates for network 
participation. 
• Resources – Budget 
• Flexibility / Adaptability 
• Combined Training 
• Problem Solving 
Successes Replicated: Incremental network successes were replicated 
including the development of regional policies, highlighting increased 
incident efficiencies, identifying lessons learned, preparedness gaps 
identified and closed, and continued fostering of relationships.  
• History- success 
• De-confliction 
• Formal Procedures 
• Increased Familiarity of 
Interagency Capability  
Motivation for the Development of the Networks  
Felt Need: Network initiators recognized a need for increased 
collaboration at the strategic and tactical level. A desire to break from 
“settling complex interdisciplinary issues in the street at 2 am”. 
• Felt Need 
• Goals-Divergent 
• Problem-consensus 
Change in Mission Scope: Post 9/11 the increased attention to the threat 
of terrorism affected the entire spectrum of the response community.  
• Familiarity w/ other 
organizations 
• Role Clarity 
Increasing Public Sector Accountability: Field commanders felt 
increasing accountability in many forms and from many sources.  
• Felt Need 
• Goal / Outcome 
Outcomes from the Networks  
Development of Regional Policies: This issue took two forms; 1) the 
development of regional policies and 2) the de-confliction of individual 
agency policies.  
• De-confliction 
• Shared Vision 
Relationships: Cited as how work gets done, the relationships fostered 
have had a direct effect on effectiveness and efficiency. 
• Social Capital 
• Trust 
Bottom Up Preparedness: This foundational approach utilizes local risk 
assessments to identify and meet regional needs.  
• Problem Consensus 
• Appreciate what other 
orgs bring to problem 
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C. PHASES OF HOW THE NETWORKS DEVELOPED 
1. Change Agents – The initiation of both of the networks was 
accomplished by mid-level change agents. These individuals included the field leadership 
of various specialized tactical units from the fire and law enforcement services.  
Interpretation: The respondents did not wait for top-down direction to identify a 
process to remedy their identified need. These individuals relayed a sense of 
empowerment to initiate an organizational change that would reduce their agencies’ 
literal and figurative liability from the consequences of homeland security issues as each 
of them oversaw a specialized unit that would be called upon in any significant regional 
event. 
2. Leadership – A strong inter-agency partnership existed between the 
County Sheriff and one local Fire Chief. Soon this leadership had the commitment of two 
of the other major players in the region, the City Police Department and the City Fire 
Department. The combined group’s visionary leadership led to political and financial 
commitments to meet the locally identified needs faced by the region.  
So the political side was being taken care of, [these leaders] were very 
strong partners; they believed in it and committed to it. What that did was, 
even though we didn’t have formal procedures, give us complete support 
and we could speak on behalf of agencies and commit money and 
resources. – Co-founder, TCN  
Interpretation: The respondents indicated they were given a means or 
“permission” for these collaborative efforts to proceed without specific direction on how 
to accomplish the ends. An incontrovertible element in these leaders’ decisions was the 
history of collaborative efforts throughout the region (e.g., each of the leaders sat on the 
Operational Area Counsel, a regional collaborative network in operation for over sixty 
years).  
3. Network construction – Both the CTR and the TCN were modeled after 
existing programs. The Tactical Commanders Network was modeled after the Terrorism 
Early Warning Group, while the Consortium of Technical Responders was modeled after 
a similar group of the same name.   
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Even the largest agencies didn't have the capabilities or the capacity to 
deal with these types of issues.  When the groups were formed the idea 
was to bring these partners together to advance and discuss the state of 
situational awareness, and not so much operational. We did an 
assessment, a real assessment, and then it truly became a consequence 
management piece. – Co-founder, TCN 
We talked to Jonathan Hall, who developed the CTR in Los Angeles, and 
he arranged for us to attend one of his meetings to see what it was about.  
We flew down attended the meeting and pretty much took a blueprint home 
with us of how we were going to do it. – Co-founder, CTR 
 
Interpretation: The network structure utilized never seemed to be in question; 
perhaps as a result of other functioning collaborative networks in the region. While the 
structure of the Tactical Commanders Network was initially patterned after the Terrorism 
Early Warning Group, its focus changed from situational awareness to consequence 
management in an effort to meet the locally identified regional needs. Both groups relied 
heavily upon relationships for the initiation efforts – internally with the groups 
comprising the networks and externally looking to existing systems in other regions.  
Formalized meeting criteria were established, including the use of structured agendas and 
formalized facilitation to strengthen system information exchange. 
4. Participant Selection – Network participant selection went far beyond 
traditional first responders to encompass a multi-disciplinary/multi-governance-level 
cross section that is representative of complex homeland security incident management. 
For example if someone sends a white powder in the mail it's not just a 
hazardous materials incident involving county environmental and the fire 
department; Public Health has to eventually receive that sample while 
local law enforcement maintains incident command. Additionally the U.S. 
Postal Inspection Service has a mandate to investigate and prosecute in 
concert with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. –Co-founder, CTR 
Interpretation: According to the respondents, participant selection – in risk 
assessment fashion – is based upon those disciplines that are likely to be drawn upon in 
any given homeland security incident. While some members are specifically sought out,  
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all interested parties are welcome and participant selection is never exclusionary. Rank is 
not necessarily a consideration in participant selection, but the ability of that individual to 
speak for his or her agency is paramount. 
5. Mission Clarification – The increased recognition of interagency 
interdependence dictated that requisite mission scope be clarified. The following quote 
indicates how an issue of mission clarification was resolved. 
The fire department gets into places that cops don't necessarily, so I'm just 
looking at them to report suspicious odd things that they happen to see. 
Using them as proactive collectors of data is a role contrary to what fire 
has always done; it's easy for a cop to do that, but much more problematic 
with fire because it's not a role they normally do. They are invited into 
people's houses cops are not, so we try to keep the distinction there for 
their own sake because problems could arise if you're not careful with 
that. – Co-founder, TCN 
Interpretation: The respondents indicated that mission clarity is seen as 
necessary for increasing effective information exchange while reducing potential liability 
and duplication of efforts. Furthermore, mission clarification provided an opportunity to 
identify gaps that existed on the periphery of each of the disciplines’ preparedness efforts 
(e.g. law enforcement borrowing the fire department’s self-contained breathing apparatus 
or HAZMAT teams borrowing bullet-proof vests to meet a particular mission objective).  
It was reported that, prior to the collaborative efforts, as these disciplines came together 
under a shared vision to meet a need their integration was not always seamless. 
6. Overcome Resistance – Upon initiation of the collaborative networks, 
resistance surfaced on a number of fronts. Political resistance was encountered as 
network participants fought to maintain their traditional modus operandi.  Financial 
resistance surfaced as network participants were occasionally in direct competition for 
budget allocations and potential grant funding. Finally, without organizational mandates 
for network participation, longevity and stability issues surfaced. 
There was a spirit of cooperation for the intent to communicate but not 
necessarily a consensus on direction.  The cooperation was to be at the 
table in the discussion into the dialogue, but there were some friendly 
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debates back and forth about a particular call or a particular policy that 
was still in development. –Co-founder, CTR 
Those snags happen and so what you do is you look at it and instead of it 
being a barrier that's going to stop you, you find a way around it. You 
build that into your planning. Instead of fighting to change something 
you're not going to change, you workaround it. You have got to be flexible 
enough to do that. – Co-founder, TCN 
Interpretation: It was repeatedly indicated that flexibility and adaptability are 
key components to the collaboration effort.  A goal of having everything standardized 
was reportedly not viewed as realistic; the realistic goal was finding a way to make 
policies, procedures and equipment interoperable. Leadership and communication skills 
were cited as invaluable in this arena as eventually someone will feel that their agency 
has come out on the losing end of an issue. 
7. Successes Replicated – Incremental network successes were replicated, 
including the development of regional policies, emphasis on increased incident 
efficiencies, identification of lessons learned, preparedness gaps being identified and 
closed, and the continued fostering of relationships. The following quote is an example of 
a real life lesson learned:  
A few months ago Agency X went to an incident at an agricultural 
processing facility involving a water-reactive fumigant, so they gave us a 
presentation at the network meeting. A month later we responded to the 
railroad where some of our guys were exposed to that same water-reactive 
fumigant.  As a result of the network meeting [our personnel] were better 
able to protect themselves. –Co-founder, CTR. 
Interpretation: The replication and relay of successes was viewed as necessary 
to institutionalize the organizational change process. As more successes were realized 
and broadcast, more people recognized the value of the collaborative effort. In an 
example of this trend, both networks positively reported monthly discussions about 
incidents of significance.  
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D. MOTIVATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETWORKS 
1. Felt Need – Post 9/11 the first-responder community acknowledged that 
the autonomy commonly practiced by various agencies was no longer an acceptable 
business practice in the region. Individual departments such as fire and law enforcement 
realized the interdependent nature of the problems they faced. 
 
When overwhelming numbers of anthrax scares started going around the 
United States, our Special Operations Division sought out a way to 
effectively deal with these.  There were some cutting-edge technologies out 
there but it wasn't being widely accepted.  For example, we actively 
sought out the technology to look at a white power under a microscope.  
Our health department said absolutely not, you guys are not 
microbiologists.  So we reached out to them and said what we want to do 
is look at these images and then send them to you to make the decision.  
Then the FBI was saying we're not going to do that, we're going to take 
them straight to the labs and we don't care about your issues with 
decontamination and whether or not you're closing down businesses. It 
became clear right away that we had to collaborate with our partners and 
come to consensus in order for this to work because us doing on our own 
just wasn't going to happen. – Co-founder, CTR 
Interpretation: The data indicates that the networks were set up to mitigate a fear 
of consequences brought on by strategic and tactical dissatisfactions as experienced by 
the change agents. Examples of these dissatisfactions were procedural conflicts noticed 
with the exponential increase in the volume of homeland security incidents; a portion of 
the incidents were attributed to increased vigilance while many others were the direct 
result of anthrax incident copy-cats. Ultimately, problem consensuses made the vision of 
collaboration retrospectively clear in a post 9/11 environment. 
2. Change in Mission Scope – Post 9/11, issues surfaced that had not been 
widely supported prior to the event. These included (but were not limited to) issues raised 
by the National Preparedness Goal and its subsequent Target Capabilities List, the 
Interim Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan, the National Incident Management 
System and the National Response Plan.  The following quote indicates how 9/11 
changed the environmental perceptions of what was important. 
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Those same folks [Al Queda] were here doing those same things prior to 
9/11. As a matter of fact, some of the main players you know with Al 
Queda actually traveled up and down the central valley [CA] in 
fundraising prior to 9/11. It is just that no one looked at them as a threat 
at that point. – Co-founder, TCN 
Interpretation: The respondents indicated that the region’s mission grew 
exponentially following 9/11 and few administrators questioned the broadened mission 
scope. None of these sweeping changes would have been possible without a large 
infusion of federal grant dollars that not only bolstered existing capabilities but funded 
new ones. Expanded missions included adding a new Intelligence Fusion Center, having 
Hazardous Material Response Teams field test for biological agents, and the purchase of 
self-contained breathing apparatus with training, for law enforcement. When homeland 
security was declared to be an all-hazard undertaking the mission scope of all public 
safety agencies was, literally, redefined. 
3. Increasing Public Sector Accountability – This recurring theme took 
many forms, including increased financial accountability to the public and government 
regulators, increased attention from the media, and increased personal liability for the 
field commanders themselves.   
Public officials and other operational officers are being held accountable 
now in ways that they weren’t before. – Co-founder, TCN 
You know everybody is armchair quarterbacking on how you are doing it. 
The media is there judging you all the time. Governmental agencies across 
the board are being held more accountable. Incident commanders are 
being taken on criminally. – Co-founder, CTR 
Interpretation: This issue became a motivating factor in the development of the 
networks as responders recognized improved information availability and exchange as a 
precursor to increased incident effectiveness and efficiency.  For example, as early white 
powder incidents were overloading the response system nationwide, the protocol solution 
allowed responders to drive out, pick the powder samples up, and deliver them to the lab.  
This, however, flew in the face of Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
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(OSHA) regulations.  A new protocol was developed and brought forth for regional 
adoption in an attempt to meet the needs of all involved. 
E. OUTCOMES FROM THE NETWORKS 
1. Development of Regional Policies – Given the autonomous nature of 
public safety organizations in a pre-9/11 environment, it was no surprise that policies and 
procedures did not align across or between disciplines.  
 
I think it is unprecedented in my twenty years of experience of being able 
to sit at the table with an FBI agent and say “What you are doing is not 
meeting my needs as a customer,” or vice versa. – Co-founder, CTR 
Discussing radiation response protocols for first responders, we've 
effectively changed the seven counties surrounding Sacramento and their 
EMS protocols addressing radiation. When Placer County first changed 
their protocols they weren't that excited about it.  We kind of put the 
technical light and educated them as to the ramifications of acting against 
this greater body of knowledge. – Co-founder, CTR 
Interpretation: Incongruent inter- and intra-disciplinary policies were cited 
repeatedly throughout the interviews. One barrier to collaboration was ignorance of 
interagency capabilities. An oft-cited solution included a migration toward regional 
policies with the acknowledgement that individual agency policies had their place, 
providing they were de-conflicted across departments. One enabler used to begin the de-
confliction process is indicated in the quote above: the idea that each agency is a 
customer of every other agency in the network. While this initial mindset is one of 
coordinating and cooperating, early successes have led to examples of true regional 
policy collaboration. In a recent case in point, a radiation response policy that was 
adopted locally has had a trickle up effect as the regional Emergency Medical Services 
Authority (EMSA) has now adopted the same policy, implementing it across a seven 
county area. The EMSA policy adoption was a direct result of the Consortium of 
Technical Responders credibility, where a greater body of knowledge aided the region in 
better decision making. 
 58
2. Relationships – The softer and more complex side of why the regional 
collaborative networks were developed has to do with how the constituent agencies 
actually interact. Replete throughout the data are indications that policies, mandates, and 
goals may provide direction, but interpersonal relationships are how things get done.  
Personal relationships were really important because when we had a 
disagreement we stuck in and worked it out. – Co-founder, TCN 
One of the things we noticed was that relationships were built independent 
of badge, uniform or branch of service. Federal, State or Local, all were 
there at the same table with the same collaborative mission of bettering 
their response. – Co-founder, CTR 
Interpretation: Relationship building takes significant effort at a regional level 
across disciplines.  However given the fact that these relationships are also fostered 
across all levels of governance and additionally include non traditional preparedness 
partners (e.g., university researchers) the task becomes exponentially more complex. 
Cited benefits of the fostered relationships included increased trust, social capital and 
better decisions made in a timelier fashion. These foundational enablers then transcended 
all other issues, including highly political ones like financial (grant) resource allocation, 
incident management efficiencies, and even power sharing.  
3. Bottom Up Preparedness – There was early recognition in the case study 
region that national preparedness could only come from the bottom up.   Local 
preparedness for the everyday event was viewed as the foundation that everything else 
was built upon.  
This is an example of how these guys can work together and there is a lot 
of information. Not just on…terrorists and stuff, but day in and day out the 
normal things that we all deal with. – Co-founder, TCN 
One big success is we not only do terrorism things but we talk about 
typical hazards. – Co-founder, CTR 
Interpretation: The concept of national preparedness originating from local 
preparedness is deeply rooted in how the case study region’s preparedness networks 
operate. This is based largely on the premise that increased local preparedness reduces 
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the subsequent need for regional, state and national assistance. One example of 
maximizing preparedness are the monthly discussions of recent incidents of significance 
along with any lessons learned for the benefit of those not at the incident. Borrowing 
from the increased trust mentioned above, cases were cited in the data where the lessons 
learned now include what errors in judgment and technique were made. This mature 
system results not only in relaying information on “what to do” but also “what not to do.”  
F.  ANALYSIS OF PARALLELS FROM COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
MODEL 
Table 21 also identifies parallel sub-dimensions based on Hocevar, Thomas, and 
Jansen’s Collaborative Capacity Model58.  The first section of the table lists the Phases of 
the Networks’ Development which are listed in chronological order.  An examination of 
the sub-dimensions in this section shows that the earliest stages include stakeholders with 
an identified purpose and needs, followed by leadership support and a history of 
collaboration.  Next, informal dimensions of social network ties and trust played a role.  
Then roles, skills, and information sharing were initiated.  Finally, more formal 
dimensions such as budget, training, and procedures became more prevalent.  When 
comparing the subsections Phases, Motivation, and Outcomes, Motivation sub-
dimensions include felt need, role clarity, and shared goals.  Outcomes sub-dimension 
parallels include shared vision, social capital, acknowledgement of what other agencies 
bring to the problem, and trust. It should be noted that the specific outcomes are unique to 
this scenario based upon the context in which they occurred.  
G.  SUMMARY 
In the examination of how and why the regional collaborative networks were 
developed, the respondents were clear: the regional collaborative networks were 
developed to meet locally identified needs.  No consideration of national-level policy or 
guidance was ever mentioned by the respondents as a reason for network initiation 
efforts.  
                                                 
58 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacity for Homeland Security,” i 
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The local collaborative solution to address the needs of these respondents was not 
without issues. In laying out the transactions of these networks in a sequential manner, as 
done in the developmental framework above, some of these issues are brought to light 
with the goal of informing other regions considering the adoption of a collaborative 
network system.  
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VI. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter summarizes the findings of this research effort and is organized 
around the project’s central questions: (1) Why and how were the Regional Collaborative 
Networks developed? (2) What is the collaborative capacity of the preparedness web 
system? (3) What opportunities for system improvement can be identified? Using 
Bellavita’s framework for the management of complex adaptive systems,59 
recommendations are provided for those regions considering the initiation of a 
collaborative network preparedness system.  
B. WHY AND HOW WERE THE REGIONAL COLLABORATIVE 
NETWORKS DEVELOPED?  
The qualitative findings illustrate that the regional collaborative networks were 
developed to meet locally identified needs, specifically with regard to homeland security 
preparedness and consequence management. Consistent with Comfort’s development of 
auto adaptive systems60, satisfying these needs dictated that the newly defined 
interagency mission be based on local standardized risk assessments allowing efficient 
vulnerability management and coordinated planning. Given these instigating 
circumstances, the regional collaborative networks do a remarkable job of actively 
maintaining a balance between a macro view of the threat of terrorism and a micro view 
of the region’s day-to-day needs.  
The findings also illustrate the regional collaborative networks were patterned on 
pre-existing regional systems focused on information exchange. The importance of this 
point is emphasized by Jackson: 
The requirements for information sharing must be addressed during the 
preparedness efforts. Building the needed relationships between 
individuals and organizations so that information can flow is difficult or 
                                                 
59 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security, Shape Patterns not Programs,” 15. 
60 Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Response to Terrorism,” 48. 
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impossible in the charged and high-pressure atmosphere of an ongoing 
disaster response. For sharing to occur effectively, the elements must be in 
place before a disaster occurs." 61 
Further, the preparedness web validates Comfort’s assertion that, with auto-adaptive 
systems, effective information exchange is bounded by shared risk, not jurisdictional 
boundary.62  
Findings of the network’s emphasis on the regional approach is in itself 
noteworthy, but the inclusion of multi-governance levels and the addition of 
nontraditional preparedness partners (e.g. university researchers) adds to the system’s 
uniqueness while bolstering its value. This same methodology is offered by Wermuth as a 
key to homeland security preparedness effectiveness.63  This approach also correlates 
with Comfort in her contention that “regional systems of risk reduction and response are 
likely to emerge in metropolitan areas as the most effective balance between size, 
capacity and specificity needed for effective action.”64 
Finally, the findings demonstrate several aspects of the preparedness web’s auto-
adaptive nature.  These include:  the development of regional policies; highlighting of 
increased incident efficiencies; identifying lessons learned; preparedness gaps being 
identified and closed; and continued fostering of relationships.  The preparedness web is 
what Comfort calls a “system of continuous learning that fosters initiative and 
responsible action at all government levels through mutual adjustment and reciprocal 
exchange of resources.”65  
 
                                                 
61 Jackson, “Information Sharing and Emergency Responder Safety Management”2. 
62 Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Response to Terrorism,” 48. 
63Wermuth, “Emergency Preparedness in California,” 6.  
64 Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Response to Terrorism,” 48. 
65 Ibid. 
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C. WHAT IS THE COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY OF THE 
PREPAREDNESS WEB SYSTEM?  
By all indications of this research effort, the collaborative capacity of the 
preparedness web system is very high. It is notable that the “home organizations” self-
reported a moderate level of collaborative capacity, while the networks’ self-reported 
capacity was much higher. A portion of this can be explained by the networks’ singular 
focus on collaboration. Nonetheless the trend seems to indicate that the composite 
networked structure is better equipped to meet the regional preparedness and 
consequence management needs than the hierarchical organizations as supported by 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 66, Comfort 67, Jackson 68, and Wermuth 69. 
Quantitatively, the high collaborative capacity was supported by strong enablers 
of: information sharing, adaptability, a history of collaboration, felt need, shared vision, 
interagency capability awareness, conflict management, and an increased trust in and 
respect for interagency partners. It must be remembered that these items were not isolated 
strengths; these items were system wide strengths. When viewed through a multi-
disciplinary and multi-governance level lens the significance of this list is appropriately 
magnified. 
Several issues were identified in the problem statement of this research effort, 
indicating some reasons why, nationally, field leadership had an aversion to utilizing 
collaboration to meet their homeland security preparedness needs. These reasons 
included (a) ineffective leadership; (b) lack of commitment, primarily stemming from a 
lack of trust and knowledge of interdisciplinary capabilities; (c) poor communications; 
and (d) poor planning, leading to resource allocation issues.70 An examination of the data 
readily identifies multiple collaborative enablers and concrete examples that address each 
of these concerns. Some issues – like leadership – are an amalgamation of many of the 
                                                 
66 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 9. 
67 Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Response to Terrorism,” 48. 
68 Jackson, “Information Sharing and Emergency Responder Safety Management”2. 
69 Wermuth, “Emergency Preparedness in California,”  6. 
70 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn.”6-8. 
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system’s collaborative enabling characteristics, while others – such as an increased 
familiarity with interagency capabilities, increased trust, and increased information 
availability and exchange – are singularly identified.  
Given these data, it stands to reason that a preparedness web utilizing regional 
collaborative networks may well be applicable to meet homeland security preparedness 
missions on a nationwide basis. With this vision, other regions would do well do draw as 
many parallels as possible between their own situations and the thematic analysis of how 
and why these networks were established in the first place. 
D. WHAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT CAN BE 
IDENTIFIED? 
One characteristic was identified as an inhibitor to the networks collaborative 
capacity: an absence of training to enhance collaborative skills. Identifying this absence 
as an inhibitor to the home organizations’ collaborative capacity suggests potential value 
for the case study region to utilize economies of scale in the development and delivery of 
training opportunities.  
Another limitation identified by the collaborative capacity audit was the lack of 
metrics to quantify benefits to the home organizations. This limitation has the ability to 
affect system longevity as the collaborative capacity audit points out that the 
institutionalization of approaches mandates the need to articulate the connections 
between behaviors and successes.71 This point is consistent with the quantitative data 
indicating that a lack of institutionalized agency approaches (e.g., a lack of mandated 
staffing for the networks) was considered to be a problem. Kotter indicates that over time, 
these factors could lead the programs to predictable, and thus preventable, difficulties.72 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS  
For those regions looking for a methodology to meet all homeland security 
preparedness needs, the creation of a preparedness web can be, as indicated by this 
                                                 
71 Hocevar et al., “Building Collaborative Capacity.” 
72 Kotter, “Leading Change,” 59. 
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research, considered one practical option. This brings up one of the difficulties in offering 
recommendations regarding the implementation of a complex adaptive system like a 
preparedness web: there is no guarantee that the cause and effect relationship will repeat 
itself outside of the original context.73 However, what can be offered are 
recommendations of what the case study region retrospectively views as strategic intent. 
These strategic intentions are offered as recommendations for those seeking 
collaboration results similar to those found in this research. These recommendations have 
been placed into the framework proffered by Christopher Bellavita for the management 
of complex adaptive systems: (1) set boundaries, (2) create attractors, (3) stabilize 
desirable patterns, and (4) disrupt undesirable patterns,74 (as displayed in Table 22). 
“Setting boundaries” includes actions taken to define the “who, what, where, and why” 
for which the activities are intended to occur. “Creating attractors” includes activities 
undertaken to minimize the effort that participants will need to undertake to realize 
effective change. “Stabilizing and disrupting” patterns encompass the active management 
of the complex relationships.  Each of the listed items was derived from the qualitative 
data and was broken out during the coding process. Some items have been paraphrased 
by the author to eliminate duplication of similar offerings while maintaining intent.  
                                                 
73 Anderson, “Complexity Theory,” 217. 
74 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security, Shape Patterns not Programs,” 15. 
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Table 22.    Recommendations. 
Setting Boundaries 
• The use of agreements to transcend geo-political lines is obligatory. Mutual and 
Automatic Aid Agreements, Boundary Drops, Memoranda of Understanding and Joint 
Power Authorities are all extensively used tools. These agreements then become 
foundational for further efforts.  
• As a mission, make regional needs drive policy, not the opposite.  
• A balance needs to be struck between having the efforts foundation built on 
relationships and formal organizational mandates. Without organizational mandates for 
participation, personnel transfers, promotions, and retirements have a potentially 




• Prior to initiating the effort, visit someone who is already engaged in a similar effort. 
This way the initiating region starts on a desired path, not building the path. 
• Secure strong political and financial commitment prior to implementation. While the 
effort can be made absent these enablers, by design these networks function on limited 
time and money – a lack of these attractors may constrain the effectiveness of your 
efforts. 
• Relationships are clearly how a majority of the work gets done in this environment. 
Foster these relationships in every undertaking. Leadership here will be critical. 
• Many of the agencies in the room with you will potentially be in direct competition for 
either annual budget resources or potential grant dollars. This needs to be looked upon 
as a synergistic opportunity. 
• Establish written mission statements with common, measurable goals and objectives.   
 
Stabilize Desirable Patterns 
• Approach this preparedness network as a regional partnership. To allow political or 
parochial proceedings, intended or not, will disable the effort as many of the resulting 
efficiencies will be based upon strengthened relationships resulting in social capital and 
increased trust.  
• Check your ego at the door. A network built on trust, character, and competence will 
increase the speed of decision-making, increase the quality of decisions, and lower 
costs.  
• If policies cannot be made regional then look to make disparate policies compatible 
across disciplines. 
 
Disrupt Undesirable Patterns 
• The participating personnel must be able to speak with the full authority of their 
agencies. Having the right people in attendance means that products are carried back to 
the home agencies as actionable items, not requests for permission. This becomes a time 
management issue.  
• Early establishment of a conflict resolution methodology will allow issues to be 
resolved before they escalate to network-wide disputes with political divisions. 
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F. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. The Examination, Validation, and Presentation of Any Regional 
Approach to Preparedness.  
Given our nation’s episodic and fragmented approach to preparedness for all-
hazard homeland security incidents, there is further need for the examination, validation, 
and presentation of any regional preparedness system that takes a multi-disciplinary and 
multi-governance-level approach. It is critical, as pointed out by William Pelfrey, that 
any further discussions of preparedness simultaneously explore complexity theory.75 A 
purely social science approach surely contributes to the effort of advancing our 
understanding of the enabling and disabling characteristics of social interactions, but this 
must be viewed as only the first step on a road to examining social behavioral 
evolution.76 For this to occur, studies like this one will need to be broadened and 
replicated over time.  
2. Defining Preparedness 
In a grossly underdeveloped benchmark, work must continue on defining 
“preparedness”. If one were to take the National Preparedness Goal as gospel, 
preparedness would largely equate only to capabilities. This definition is hollow without 
preparedness’ accompanying requisite characteristics. Without at least a set of categorical 
definitions there is currently no possible way to measure progress in meeting this end. 
Furthermore, resulting efforts will continue to be intermittent and incongruent at an 
unsustainable cost of finite resources. Lastly, without a common definition, what should 
be measurable value judgments of needed capabilities and supporting characteristics will 
continue to be little more than guesses; pity the citizenry and responders in regions that 
guess wrong. 
                                                 
75 Pelfrey, “The Cycle of Preparedness,” 13. 
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 Overall Ratings of Home Organizations Across Collaboration 
Dimensions 
Strategy & Purpose 
Overall   
N=47 
My home organization considers the interests of other agencies in our planning.* 
3.2       
(0.5) 
My home organization is willing to address cross-agency goals.* 
3.4       
(0.6) 
Interagency collaboration is a high priority for my home organization.* 
3.3       
(0.7) 
My home organization is willing to invest resources to accomplish cross-agency goals.* 
3.1       
(0.7) 
My home organization is able to balance our individual organizational goals with cross agency 
(regional) requirements.** 
3.0       
(0.7) 
Structure   
My home organization is willing to adapt procedures to meet the requirements of other 
organizations with which we do interagency work.*  
3.1       
(0.6) 
My home organization invests significant time and energy to de-conflict existing policies and 
processes that impede collaboration. * 
2.9       
(0.7) 
My home organization has developed an understanding of our interagency roles and 
responsibilities. * 
3.0       
(0.6) 
My home organization has measurement criteria in place that evaluate the organizational level 
benefits of collaboration.* 
2.3       
(0.7) 
Lateral Mechanisms   
My home organization supports the decisions and recommendations of the interagency team.  * 
3.0       
(0.6) 
My home organization commits adequate human and financial resources to training with our 
interagency partners.*    
2.7       
(0.8) 
My home organization gives members of the interagency team adequate authority to speak on 
behalf of the organization.*   
3.0       
(0.6) 
My home organization has strong norms that encourage sharing information with other 
agencies. *   
3.1       
(0.6) 
My home organization invests time and resources to become familiar with the capabilities and 
requirements of our partner organizations.*    
2.7       
(0.6) 
My home organization is flexible in adapting our procedures to better fit with those of partner 
organizations. *   
2.8       
(0.6) 
My home organization provides other agencies adequate access to information we have that is 
relevant to their work.* 
3.2       
(0.6) 
My home organization works with other agencies to identify lessons learned for improved 
collaboration.  * 
3.0       
(0.6) 
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My home organization makes necessary investments in the infrastructure for collaboration. *  
2.7       
(0.7) 
People in my home organization actively engage in exchanges with counterparts in other 
organizations.*    
3.3       
(0.6) 
My home organization has the technical interoperability to enable effective interagency 
collaboration.  * 
3.1       
(0.7) 
Incentives - Motivation and Leadership   
A history of competition and conflict affects my home organization's interagency capability. *  
2.3       
(0.7) 
My home organization has experienced successful interagency collaboration in the past.  * 
3.3       
(0.5) 
In my home organization, collaborative activities, and responsibilities are added on top of our 
regular work load. *  
3.2       
(0.6) 
To what extent does leadership support collaboration in your home organization? **  
3.2       
(0.9) 
My home organization saves on costs of technology and equipment by collaborating with other 
agencies. *       
2.7       
(0.9) 
A significant motivation for my home organizations involvement in interagency collaboration is 
the opportunity for outside funding.*    
2.7       
(0.8) 
People and People Processes   
Members of my home organization are aware of the capabilities of other organizations with 
which we work.*    
2.9       
(0.6) 
People in my home organization are unwilling to share information with others. *  
1.9       
(0.6) 
Members in my home organization are willing to share decision-making authority with other 
organizations when addressing interagency issues. *  
2.9       
(0.6) 
Members in my home organization respect the expertise of those in other organizations with 
whom we have to work. *   
3.3       
(0.4) 
My home organization manages conflict well. *   
2.7       
(0.7) 
My home organization has training in place to develop collaborative skills (e.g., conflict 
management, team process skills). *  
2.3       
(0.7) 
People in my home organization tend to be suspicious and distrustful of our counterparts in 
other organizations. *  
2.2       
(0.6) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
**  4 point scale; 1-Rarely to 4-Almost Always 
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APPENDIX D 
 Overall Ratings of Regional Collaborative Networks Across 
Collaboration Dimensions 
Strategy & Purpose  
Interagency collaboration is a high priority for [this network].* 
3.5            
(0.7) 
[This network’s] participants are able to balance individual organizational goals with 
cross-agency (regional) requirements.** 
3.2            
(0.8) 
[This network] has clearly established goals for interagency collaboration.* 
2.9            
(0.7) 
[This network] has contributed to the creation of a shared vision for interagency 
collaboration on a regional basis. * 
3.3            
(0.5) 
Structure   
[This network] is willing to adapt procedures to meet the requirements of other 
organizations with which we do interagency work. * 
3.1            
(0.4) 
[This network] invests significant time and energy to de-conflict existing policies and 
processes that impede collaboration.*  
3.1            
(0.6) 
[This network] has developed an understanding of our interagency roles and 
responsibilities. * 
3.1            
(0.5) 
Lateral Mechanisms   
[This network] has strong norms that encourage sharing information with other 
agencies.*    
3.4            
(0.5) 
[This network] is flexible in adapting our procedures to better fit with those of partner 
organizations.*    
3.2            
(0.5) 
[This network] has adequate access to needed information from other agencies.*    
3.2            
(0.6) 
[This network] works with other agencies to identify lessons learned for improved 
collaboration.*   
3.3            
(0.5) 
People in [this network] actively engage in exchanges with counterparts in other 
organizations.*    
3.4            
(0.5) 
Incentives - Motivation and Leadership   
A history of competition and conflict affects [this network’s] interagency capability. *  
2.0           
(0.7) 
[This network] has experienced successful interagency collaboration in the past. *  
3.4            
(0.5) 
People and People Processes   
Members of [this network] are aware of the capabilities of other organizations with 
which we work.*    
3.2            
(0.5) 
People in [this network] are unwilling to share information with others.*   
1.8            
(0.8) 
Members in [this network] are willing to share decision-making authority with other 
organizations when addressing interagency issues.*   
3.0            
(0.5) 
Members in [this network] respect the expertise of those in other organizations with 
whom we have to work.*    
3.3            
(0.6) 
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Members in [this network] manage conflict well.*    
3.2           
(0.6) 
[This network] has training in place to develop collaborative skills (e.g., conflict 
management, team process skills).*   
2.5            
(0.5)   
People in [this network] tend to be suspicious and distrustful of our counterparts in 
other organizations. *  
1.8            
(0.6) 
*   4 point scale; 1-Strongly Disagree to 4-Strongly Agree 
**  4 point scale; 1-Rarely to 4-Almost Always 
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APPENDIX E 
Home Organization vs Regional Networks - Identical Survey Items 
 Home Regional 
Strategy & Purpose  Organization  Network 
Interagency collaboration is a high priority for my home 
organization. 
3.3               
(0.7) 
3.5               
(0.7) 
[This network’s] participants are able to balance individual 
organizational goals with cross-agency (regional) requirements. 
3.0               
(0.7) 
3.2               
(0.8) 
Structure   
My home organization is willing to adapt procedures to meet the 
requirements of other organizations with which we do 
interagency work.  
3.1               
(0.6) 
3.1               
(0.4) 
My home organization invests significant time and energy to de-
conflict existing policies and processes that impede collaboration. 
2.9               
(0.7) 
3.1               
(0.6) 
My home organization has developed an understanding of our 
interagency roles and responsibilities.  
3.0               
(0.6) 
3.1               
(0.5) 
Lateral Mechanisms   
[This network] has strong norms that encourage sharing 
information with other agencies.    
3.1               
(0.6) 
3.4               
(0.5) 
[This network] is flexible in adapting our procedures to better fit 
with those of partner organizations.    
2.8               
(0.6) 
3.2               
(0.5) 
[This network] has adequate access to needed information from 
other agencies.    
3.2               
(0.6) 
3.2               
(0.6) 
[This network] works with other agencies to identify lessons 
learned for improved collaboration.   
3.0               
(0.6) 
3.3               
(0.5) 
People in [this network] actively engage in exchanges with 
counterparts in other organizations.    
3.3               
(0.6) 
3.4               
(0.5) 
Incentives - Motivation and Leadership   
A history of competition and conflict affects my home 
organization's interagency capability.   
2.3               
(0.7) 
2.0               
(0.7) 
My home organization has experienced successful interagency 
collaboration in the past.   
3.3               
(0.5) 
3.4               
(0.5) 
People and People Processes   
Members of [this network] are aware of the capabilities of other 
organizations with which we work.    
2.9               
(0.6) 
3.2               
(0.5) 
People in [this network] are unwilling to share information with 
others.   
1.9               
(0.6) 
1.8               
(0.8) 
Members in [this network] are willing to share decision-making 
authority with other orgs when addressing interagency issues.   
2.9               
(0.6) 
3.0               
(0.5) 
Members in [this network] respect the expertise of those in other 
organizations with whom we have to work.    
3.3               
(0.4) 
3.3               
(0.6) 
Members in [this network] manage conflict well.    
2.7               
(0.7) 
3.2               
(0.6) 
[This network] has training in place to develop collaborative 
skills (e.g., conflict management, team process skills).   
2.3               
(0.7) 
2.5               
(0.5)   
People in [this network] tend to be suspicious and distrustful of 
our counterparts in other organizations.   
2.2               
(0.6) 
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